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The Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Laws: The United States and
European Community Approaches
ROGER P. ALFORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few subjects in international law raise such incorrigible conflicts of
interest as the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust
context. As one commentator asked with respect to a U.S. court's
assertion of jurisdiction over British defendants, "[h]ow could Ameri-
can law, how could an American judgment applying American law
possibly vary the rights and obligations created by an English con-
tract to be performed outside the United States?"' Indeed, interna-
tional law is based on the notion that a state occupies a definite
territory, within which it normally exercises exclusive jurisdiction.2
Yet this traditional doctrine of "territorial jurisdiction" has slowly
given way to more and more assertions of "extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion" and international law has reluctantly recognized such encroach-
ments. Most significantly, the past forty to fifty years have evidenced
a remarkable willingness by courts, especially courts in the United
States, to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants when their for-
eign conduct produces adverse effects upon domestic commerce. Pro-
ponents argue that such extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary for a
state effectively to regulate the anticompetitive activities of foreign
undertakings. Opponents counter that a liberal understanding of ter-
* J.D. New York University; L.L.M. Edinburgh University. This article was originally
presented as a Master's Thesis at Edinburgh University. The author is currently working as
Legal Assistant to the Honorable Richard C. Allison, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The
Hague, Netherlands.
1. 0. Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Anti-Trust Law: The Nylon Patent
Case, 18 Mod. L. Rev. 65, 67 (1955).
2. James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 162 (6th ed. 1963).
2 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ritoriality can easily address such concerns without sacrificing fidelity
to the fundamental principles of international law, among them the
principle of sovereign equality of states.
In broad strokes, this divergence of perspectives represents the
respective views of the United States and the European Community
regarding the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. This Arti-
cle compares the differing approaches of the United States and the
European Community as they wrestle with the question of how to
regulate foreign anticompetitive activity. More specifically, this Arti-
cle highlights the distinctive features of the U.S. "effects doctrine"
and the European Community's "implementation approach" and ana-
lyzes the differences that exist between the two systems. Only the
U.S. doctrine openly provides for the consideration of international
comity concerns, but both approaches have been used liberally to
assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Part II of this Article pro-
vides a background to the subject by briefly outlining the traditional
bases of prescriptive jurisdiction. Parts III and IV delineate the evo-
lutions of the U.S. approach and the European Community approach
to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust context. Part V com-
pares and contrasts the two approaches and offers some modest esti-
mations as to their respective strengths and weaknesses, including the
validity of the distinctions they create. Part VI concludes by offering
an interim solution to the problem of conflicting or concurrent com-
petition enforcement: bilateral competition enforcement cooperation
agreements such as that recently signed by the United States and the
European Community.
II. BASES OF PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION
A state generally may assert jurisdiction over conduct which occurs
within its territory and, in certain circumstances, over conduct occur-
ring outside its territory. The former constitutes jurisdiction based on
"territoriality," whereas the latter is described as "extraterritorial
jurisdiction." The "territoriality principle" is the most basic and per-
vasive principle underlying the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.3
Under the territoriality principle a state may exercise jurisdiction over
transactions, persons, or things within its territory regardless of the
nationality of the perpetrators of such conduct.4 Such territorial
3. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir.
1984); 1 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 cmt. c
(1987) [hereinafter 1 Restatement (Third)].
4. See generally Codification of International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law
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jurisdiction comports with the general maxim that "a state is compe-
tent to deal with any offence committed within its territory" 5 and may
prescribe laws applicable to "resources and persons within [its] own
territory."6  Such territorial jurisdiction has been applied and
extended to include subjective and objective territorial jurisdiction.
The former permits a state to assert jurisdiction over acts that
originated within its territory, even though they may have been com-
pleted abroad; the latter permits a state to exercise "jurisdiction over
a foreign national where a consummating act within the [s]tate's terri-
tory was a constituent element of a crime committed abroad."7
This most fundamental basis of jurisdiction-territoriality-does
not, however, delimit the application of other proper bases of so-
called "extraterritorial jurisdiction." As the Permanent Court of
International Justice posited it in the Lotus Case,8 every state remains
free to adopt principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction that it regards
as best and most suitable, provided such jurisdiction does not overstep
the limits of international law:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
states may not extend the application of their laws and the
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases
by prohibitive rules.9
School, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 480-508 (Supp. 1935)
(discussing the "territoriality principle") [hereinafter Harvard Research].
5. Brierly, supra note 2, at 299.
6. Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction, in Cecil J. Olmstead, International
Law Association, Extraterritorial Application of Laws and Responses Thereto 3, 5 (1984). See
Deepa Rishikesh, Extraterritoriality versus Sovereignty in International Antitrust Jurisdiction,
1991 World Competition 33, 34.
7. George W. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust
Laws, 63 Yale LJ. 639, 640 (1954). See also Joined Cases 89-129/85, Ahlstram v.
Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5217 [hereinafter Wood Pulp]; Christopher Bellamy &
Graham D. Child, Common Market Law of Competition 21 (1st Supp. to 3d ed. 1991). See
generally Harvard Research, supra note 4, at 484-94 (discussing subjective and objective
territorial jurisdiction).
8. S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10.
9. Id. at 19. Unfortunately, international decisions have rarely commented upon the precise
contours of these limitations. Judge Jessup, in his separate opinion in Barcelona Traction,
raised the issue as to the international law limits mentioned in the Lotus Case. Concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 LCJ. 166-67 (Feb. 5)
(Jessup, J., separate opinion). His findings, however, were inconclusive as to the "effects
doctrine." He suggested that although at least six countries have accepted an effects doctrine
of the kind found in Alcoa, such rules, while valid for interstate commerce within the United
States, may be improper when placing a burden on international commerce. Id. See infra
notes 39-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Alcoa case.
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Accordingly, international law permits numerous other bases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, under the "nationality
principle" a state may pass legislation concerning the conduct of its
nationals, whether natural or legal persons, regardless of whether
their activities occurred at home or abroad.' 0 Similarly, under the
"protective principle" a state may assert jurisdiction over crimes by
foreign nationals in a foreign territory where there is a reasonable
connection between the act and a state's legitimate interests in pro-
tecting its own national security." Closely related to this is the
"effects doctrine" which will be discussed at length below. In essence,
the effects doctrine holds that a state can assert jurisdiction over con-
duct outside its borders where such conduct has the intended effect of
causing a substantial adverse impact within the state's territory.' 2
There is considerable debate as to whether a naked or unmodified
effects doctrine is a proper basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Another basis of jurisdiction is the "universality principle" which
posits that a state may assert jurisdiction over perpetrators of acts
which are deemed so heinous that the perpetrator is an "enemy of
humanity." 13  The most controversial basis for jurisdiction is the
"passive personality" principle. It provides that a state has jurisdic-
tion over criminals committing offenses against its own nationals
10. See I Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 402(2) (declaring that a state has jurisdiction
to prescribe laws with respect to "activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory"). See generally Harvard Research, supra note 4, at 519-
39 (discussing the "nationality principle").
11. See Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 50-57 (1968) (Israel argued that its vital interests
were affected by Adolf Eichmann's crimes and that under the protective principle Israel had
the right to punish those crimes). Examples of such activity include counterfeiting a state's
currency or attacking its diplomats. See Walter Van Gerven, EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust
Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment, 1989 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 451, 453 (Barry E. Hawk
ed., 1990). See generally Harvard Research, supra note 4, at 543-61 (discussing the "protective
principle").
12. See infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
13. See Matter of Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(jurisdiction based on the assumption that some crimes are so universally condemned that the
perpetrators are the enemies of all people such that any nation which has custody of the
perpetrators may punish them according to its law applicable to such offenses), aff'd, 680 F.2d
32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982); Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 26 (stating that
crimes which "struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave
offences against the law of nations itself" and that jurisdiction is therefore universal); Jeffrey
M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 53, 60-62
(1981) (asserting that perpetrators of such acts are hostis humani generis: enemies of all
humanity).
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regardless of the nationality of the criminal or the locus of the
offense.14
In the context of applying antitrust laws extraterritorially, two of
these bases of jurisdiction are of particular significance: namely, the
territoriality principle and the "effects doctrine."' 5  Few problems
arise when a state asserts jurisdiction on the territoriality principle.' 6
It is the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction that creates the great-
est difficulties. Thus, the problem of "extraterritorial jurisdiction"
refers to the "general problem of conflicting claims by nation-states
seeking to apply their laws and implement their policies" to regulate
extraterritorial conduct "in a way which may undermine and conflict
with the laws and policies of a foreign government."' 7  Generally
speaking, courts in the United States have exercised extraterritorial
jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine.'" The European Com-
munity, in keeping with Continental skepticism toward the effects
doctrine, has attempted instead to fashion jurisdictional rules that
comport with the territorial principle.' 9 These two approaches will be
discussed in turn.
Before proceeding further, it is worth mentioning one final consid-
eration that frequently arises. In recent years, some courts have not
ended the jurisdictional inquiry after a simple finding that jurisdiction
is properly based on one or more of the extraterritorial principles dis-
cussed above. Rather, in order to show due respect for international
comity,2" these courts have developed a secondary "jurisdictional rule
14. Catherine C. Fisher, U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or
Legalized Kidnapping?, 18 Vand. J. Trans. L. 915, 930 (1985). See United States v. Yunis, 681
F. Supp. 896, 901-02 (1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086 (1991) (court, while recognizing that passive
personality is the most controversial of five identified sources of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
found that "the international community recognizes its legitimacy" and approved of its use as
"a basis for asserting jurisdiction over hostage takers" in the Convention against the Taking of
Hostages); 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 402 cmt. g (passive personality principle has
been "increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's
nationals by reason of their nationality"); Harvard Research, supra note 4, at 578.80. It would
appear that the international community's willingness to embrace the passive personality
principle is in direct proportion to the gravity of the offense and to the inability of states
effectively to combat such crimes through other jurisdictional bases.
15. See infra section III (discussing the evolution of the "effects" doctrine in U.S.
jurisprudence).
16. 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 402 cmt. c.
17. Douglas E. Rosenthal & William M. Knighton, National Laws and International
Commerce: The Problem of Extraterritoriality vii (1982).
18. See infra section III.
19. See infra section IV.
20. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined international comity as "the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
1992]
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of reason." The jurisdictional rule of reason balances, on the one
hand, the interests of a state in regulating foreign activity that has
adverse consequences on its nationals and, on the other hand, the
legitimate interests of other states that perceive such extraterritorial
regulation to be a threat to their territorial sovereignty.21 Thus, in
Barcelona Traction Judge Fitzmaurice's separate opinion urged
municipal courts to show discretion in exercising extraterritorial juris-
diction in the interests of international comity.22 He noted that inter-
national law does not impose rigid rules on states delimiting spheres
of national jurisdiction in such matters as antitrust legislation. 23 Nev-
ertheless, he reasoned that international law does presume the exist-
ence of limits and obligates every state to "exercise moderation and
restraint as to the extent of its jurisdiction" in cases having a foreign
element so as "to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more
properly appertaining to," or exercised by, another state.24 As we
shall see, the U.S. approach has fully incorporated such comity con-
cerns into its jurisdictional analysis, while the European Community
has, in practice, shown great reluctance to recognize, much less util-
ize, such a concept.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. APPROACH
"No single field of law has raised so intense and pervasive a volley
of extraterritoriality conflicts as... U.S. antitrust law."'25 The effects
doctrine has reached its apex in the American antitrust context. Not
surprisingly, it is also in this context that the debate over the proper
limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been at its most strident and
vitriolic.
The two U.S. antitrust provisions that most frequently give rise to
extraterritorial jurisdiction are sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Section 1 declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several [s]tates,
citizens." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937
("[Tihe central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals
should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation
and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability."); I Restatement
(Third), supra note 3, § 403 cmt. a (comity is a term understood as not merely an act of
discretion and courtesy but as reflecting a sense of obligations among states).
21. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
22. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 105 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Rosenthal & Knighton, supra note 17, at 18.
[Vol. 33:1
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or with foreign nations. 2 s Section 2 makes it a felony for any person
to "monopolize ... or combine or conspire.., to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several [s]tates, or with for-
eign nations. 27 These provisions are enforced through private treble
damage actions and injunctive relief in federal courts pursuant to,
respectively, sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.28 References in the
Sherman Act to trade "with foreign nations" suggest that it was
intended to regulate certain foreign conduct that restrains or mono-
polizes trade within the United States. Determining precisely what
falls within the scope of such regulation of foreign activity, however,
requires guidance from the courts.
A. Judicial Contributions: From American Banana to Laker
Airways
The first important case addressing the issue of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law was American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.29 In American Banana, the American Banana Company
brought suit against the United Fruit Company for allegedly conspir-
ing with the Costa Rican militia to monopolize production and expor-
tation of bananas from Central America to the United States.3°
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, adopted a highly restrictive
approach to extraterritoriality, noting that all of the allegedly wrong-
ful acts had occurred outside the United States.31 Justice Holmes
noted that the "general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done."32 Thus, the Court interpreted
U.S. antitrust law "as intended to be confined in its operation and
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general
and legitimate power."' 33 The clear inference of American Banana
was that U.S. antitrust laws could not be applied to conduct occurring
outside the United States.
Such a narrow definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction was short-
lived. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,34 U.S. companies allegedly
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
27. Id. § 2.
28. Id. §§ 15(a), 26.
29. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
30. See id. at 354-55.
31. Id. at 355.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 357. See also Gary B. Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts: Commentary and Materials 436 (1990).
34. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
1992]
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conspired with Mexican firms to monopolize import trade of sisal, a
plant used to make rope. The Supreme Court held that U.S. courts
had jurisdiction over the alleged conspiracy and that the Sherman Act
applied to such conduct.35 It attempted to distinguish American
Banana by noting that a few of the agreements in the sisal conspiracy
took place in the United States and that the conspiracy was funded by
U.S. banks.36 "Here we have a contract, combination, and conspiracy
entered into by parties within the United States and made effective by
acts done therein.' ' 37 Yet the Court in dictum arguably departed from
American Banana by stressing the fact that the conspiracy "brought
about forbidden results within the United States. ' '38
The decisive step heralding the beginning of the modern "effects
doctrine" in U.S. antitrust jurisdiction came in 1945 with Judge
Learned Hand's landmark decision in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America ("Alcoa").39 In Alcoa, foreign defendants were accused of
violating the Sherman Act by setting up and executing an interna-
tional aluminum cartel abroad.4° In regard to the limitations custom-
arily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers, Judge
Hand held that:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no conse-
quences within the United States.... On the other hand,
... any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends
41
Notably, such an "effects doctrine" does not apply to conduct that
may have unintended repercussions in the United States42 nor to
agreements intended to affect U.S. trade but which in fact have no
such effect.4 3 It does, however, apply to agreements which have the
35. Id. at 274.
36. Id. at 275-76.
37. Id. at 276.
38. Id.
39. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 443.
42. See id. (explaining that Congress did not intend Sherman Act to cover agreements made
beyond U.S. borders which were not intended to affect imports but which nevertheless have
domestic repercussions).
43. Id. ("[W]e shall assume that the [Sherman] Act does not cover agreements, even though
intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is shown actually to have had
some effect upon them.").
[Vol. 33:1
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intended effect of adversely impacting U.S. commerce.' Applying
this standard, the Second Circuit found that the Canadian defendants
specifically intended to affect imports into the United States and that
such imports were in fact affected.45 Accordingly, jurisdiction over
the cartel was considered proper. Thus, Alcoa effectively permits
"jurisdiction when U.S. interests [are] perceptibly at stake, and it
[does] not give way in the face of even weighty foreign interests.""
The Alcoa "effects doctrine" rapidly gained acceptance in the
United States.4 7 But Alcoa generally was met with disapproval from
abroad. It was frequently criticized by foreign governments and
scholars for its failure to consider international comity concerns and
the potential interference with foreign sovereignty interests.43 As
Lord Wilberforce observed in a celebrated case involving a U.S. anti-
trust investigation into activities of British companies, "the attempt to
44. Confusion exists over the meaning of Alcoa's intent requirement. See Born & Westin,
supra note 33, at 441-42. Some courts omit the intent requirement, others require proof of
general intent to affect U.S. commerce, while others require a showing of specific intent. See,
e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969)
(omitting intent requirement); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F.
Supp. 1161, 1184 (ED. Pa. 1980) (requiring general intent); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (general intent); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 889-91 (D.NJ. 1949) (general intent); United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947)
(requiring specific intent). Compare Born & Westin, supra note 33, at 441-42 and 1 James R.
Atwood & Kingman Brewster, Jr., Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 6.05, at 148
(2d ed. 1981) (suggesting Alcoa favors a showing of purposive conduct) with Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 6 (1977)
(interpreting Alcoa as requiring substantial and foreseeable effects). See generally John B.
Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Law, 94 Yale L-i. 1693, 1694 n.7 (1985).
45. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
46. Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and Antitrust-Is "Reasonableness" the Answer.
1986 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 49, 54 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1987).
47. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 113 (1969);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-06 (1962); Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); Industrial Invest. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,
671 F.2d 876, 883 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), reaff'd per curiam, 704 F.2d
785, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,
331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972). But see Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus. Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (rejecting the effects test alone in favor of a balancing test
which considers international comity).
48. See, e.g., Kingman Brewster, Jr., Antitrust and American Business Abroad 46-51 (1st
ed. 1958); Wilbur L. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws 344-46 (1st ed. 1958);
Nicholas Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in
Interstate and International Law, 65 Yale LJ. 1087, 1148-49 (1956); Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Relationship of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Formulation of Foreign Economic Policy, Particularly
Export and Overseas Investment Policy, 49 Antitrust L.J. 1189, 1193 (1980).
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extend the grand jury investigation extraterritorially into the activities
of the [British] RTZ companies was an infringement of United King-
dom sovereignty."49 Similarly, Professor Mann concluded that "from
the point of view of public international law the Alcoa decision cannot
be justified .... The 'effect' within the meaning of the Alcoa ruling
does not amount to an essential or constituent part of the restraint of
trade, but is an indirect and remote repercussion of a restraint carried
out, completed and, in the legally relevant sense, exhausted in the for-
eign country."50 Such perceived "Yankee 'jurisdictional jingoism' has
created widespread resentment"'" and prompted several states to
retaliate by adopting "blocking statutes" limiting the extraterritorial
reach of American antitrust legislation within their jurisdiction.5 2
To temper the harsh results created by the Alcoa judgment, several
Courts of Appeals have modified the "effects doctrine" by incorporat-
ing a "jurisdictional rule of reason" in order to show due regard, in
the interests of international comity, to the foreign sovereignty inter-
ests of third countries. Such a jurisdictional rule of reason does not
delineate the outer limits of permissive jurisdiction, but rather estab-
lishes the appropriate contours of proper jurisdiction. That is, the
search is not for "minimum acceptability but rather for maximum
rationality. ' 53  Proponents of such a jurisdictional rule of reason
49. Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [1978] 1 All E.R. (H.L.) 434, 447. Lord
Wilberforce went on to note that "[i]t is axiomatic that in anti-trust matters the policy of one
state may be to defend what is the policy of another state to attack." Id. at 448. See also
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 780, 782 (U.S.
district court restraining order against a British company is an inappropriate assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction); Kahn-Freund, supra note 1, at 67.
50. F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, in III Recueil des Cours
9, 104 (1964-1).
51. Sandage, supra note 44, at 1698. During parliamentary debate on the British blocking
statute, The Protection of Trading Interests Bill, John Nott M.P. referred to the American
approach as the "pernicious extra-territorial effects doctrine." A. Kapranos Huntley, The
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980: Some Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws, 30 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 213, 224 (1981). The comments by Charles Fletcher-
Cooke M.P. were even more vitriolic. Regarding the effects doctrine, he stated, "[o]nce a court
system gets an ideology into its mind to such a degree of fanaticism as one can find in the
United States it is no surprise, however deplorable it may be, that it becomes a matter for
imperialism overseas." Id.
52. Such "blocking statutes" include: Australian Foreign Proceedings Act, Austl. Acts 121
(1976); Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49, S.C. 1863 (1984); French
Blocking Statute, no. 80-538, Journal Officiel de ]a Republique Francaise: Edition des Lois et
Decrets [J.O.], 1799 (1980); South Africa's Protection of Businesses Act (1978), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 127 (1979); United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. These
and other blocking statutes are discussed in P.C.F. Pettit & C.J.D. Styles, The International
Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. Law.
697, 707-14 (1982).
53. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflicts of Laws,
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argue that "a strict territorial test, while it may minimize [foreign]
conflicts, is insufficiently responsive to legitimate national economic
interests."' Conversely, a naked or unmodified effects doctrine fails
to respect legitimate sovereignty interests abroad and magnifies and
encourages conflicts in an ever more interdependent international eco-
nomic arena."
The first antitrust case to incorporate this jurisdictional rule of rea-
son was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.56  In
Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit set forth a three-part test to determine
whether, in the interests of international comity, a court should exer-
cise jurisdiction: (1) whether the alleged restraint has some "actual or
intended... [effect] on American foreign commerce;" (2) whether
"the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the
plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws;" and (3)
"whether the interests of, and links to, the United States are suffi-
ciently strong, vis-a'-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion
of extraterritorial authority. '57
Following Timberlane, the Third Circuit also adopted a jurisdic-
tional rule of reason in Mannington Mills.58 The court in Mannington
Mills asked first whether jurisdiction exists. Having found that it did,
the Court then considered whether such jurisdiction should be exer-
cised in light of the individual interests and policies of the foreign
nations and the United States' legitimate interest in regulating
anticompetitive activity. 9 In balancing these competing interests, the
court identified ten relevant factors:
International Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, in H Recuel des Cours 311,
329 (1979).
54. Donald F. Turner, Application of Competition Laws to Foreign Conduct: Appropriate
Resolution of Jurisdictional Issues, 1985 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 231,233 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1986).
55. Id.
56. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
57. Id. at 613. The court listed seven factors to be considered in evaluating the comity
issues presented by the third question:
[1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; [2] the nationality or allegiance
of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations; [3] the
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance;
[4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere; [5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce; [6] the foreseeability of such effect; and [7] the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
58. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
59. See id. at 1298.
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(1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2)
Nationality of the parties; (3) Relative importance of the
alleged violation of conduct [in the United States] compared
to that abroad; (4) Availability of a remedy abroad includ-
ing the pendency of litigation there; (5) Existence of intent
to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
(6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exer-
cises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) Whether a party will
be... forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be
under conflicting requirements . . . if relief is granted; (8)
Whether the court can make its order effective; (9) Whether
an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and
(10) Whether a treaty with the affected nation has addressed
the issue.6°
Such a jurisdictional rule of reason initially received a warm recep-
tion by scholars61 and was adopted by several Courts of Appeals. Yet,
despite the prevalence of the jurisdictional balancing test, U.S. courts
in virtually every case found the balance tipped in favor of asserting
jurisdiction over the foreign entity except where the court found no
cognizable adverse impact on U.S. competition interests whatsoever.62
However desirable a balancing approach may be to the extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust laws, the present formulations of such an
approach have been subject to significant criticisms. Most impor-
tantly, the D.C. Circuit rejected the balancing approach in Laker Air-
ways.63  Laker Airways rejected the jurisdictional rule of reason
approach because it considered U.S. courts ill-equipped to determine
whether the vital national interests of the United States or those of
other nations should predominate. 64 The court emphasized that polit-
60. Id. at 1297-98 (citation omitted).
61. See Atwood & Brewster, supra note 44, § 6.11; Lowenfeld, supra note 53, at 407-11.
62. See, e.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6, 8-9 (2d Cir.
1981) ("decreased profitability of Canadian merchants is not a proper concern of the United
States"); Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax Indus., Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982) (utilizing Timberlane approach to deny extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws); Dominicus Americana Bohio, 473 F. Supp. at 687-88
("[P]roper standard is a balancing test that weighs the impact of the foreign conduct on United
States commerce against the potential international repercussions of asserting jurisdiction.").
See also Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 884-85 (finding comity relevant but not part of the jurisdictional
test).
63. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950-52.
64. See id. at 949-50 (balancing "generally incorporate[s] purely political factors which the
court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing."). See
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ical decisions balancing domestic and foreign interests were the pre-
rogative of the executive branch, not the courts.65 Such criticism
echoes the Supreme Court's admonition that while questions implicat-
ing foreign policy determinations are not completely beyond the scope
of judicial cognizance, courts should be reluctant to review these mat-
ters because "resolution of such issues frequently turn[s] on standards
that... involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed
to the executive or the legislature. ' 66 Moreover, Laker Airways found
that the balancing approach suffered from both practical and theoreti-
cal weaknesses: practically, it requires protracted discovery and
requests for submissions by political branches; theoretically, the court
noted that international law does not preclude concurrent jurisdic-
tion or require one jurisdiction to be "more reasonable" than the
other.67
The jurisdictional rule of reason has also been criticized by scholars
as vague and unworkable. Even the Restatement (Third) on Foreign
Relations Law, which adopts a balancing approach, concedes that
under the balancing approach "[n]o priority or other significance is
implied in the order in which the factors are listed. Not all considera-
tions have the same importance in all situations; the weight to be
given to any particular factor or group of factors depends on the cir-
cumstances. ' 61 Such an imprecise formulation of the relevant stan-
dards, many argue, not only increases the likelihood that a
jurisdictional rule of reason will not develop coherently and consist-
ently,69 but it also legitimizes virtually any reformulation of the rele-
vant factors so as to permit courts to assert jurisdiction.70 Put simply,
some argue that judicial interest balancing "is both inappropriate and
unworkable because it involves courts in weighing sensitive political
also Turner, supra note 54, at 233 ("[Tlhere are serious doubts that courts are an appropriate
forum for evaluating conflicting national and foreign interests on a case-by-case basis.").
65. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 955; Turner, supra note 54, at 244.
66. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
67. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950-52. See also Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5223
(discussing Laker Airways).
68. 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 403 cmt. b.
69. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 Am. J. Int'l L 280, 317 (1982) (the failure
to articulate values used to legitimize jurisdiction weakens "the development of a more rational
system of international norms.").
70. See id. (interest analysis "will usually reflect an understandable bias in favor of the
forum's policy"). See also Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 145, 185-86 (1972) (discussing tendency to apply domestic law in choice of law
determinations).
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and diplomatic concerns traditionally considered nonjusticiable."' 7
While the jurisdictional rule of reason is an imperfect instrument
for balancing foreign sovereignty interests, the harsh criticism it has
received is unjustified. By applying the standards of nonjusticiabil-
ity,7 one may conclude that a comity analysis is a subject properly
before the courts. First, impingement on foreign relations does not
ipsofacto render the matter nonjusticiable. As the Supreme Court has
noted:
[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminat-
ing analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the
history of its management by the political branches, of its
susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature
and posture in the specific case, and of the possible conse-
quences of judicial action.73
The question, then, is whether the court's undertaking of an
independent resolution is possible "without expressing a lack of
respect due coordinate branches of government." 74 Seen in this light,
a court determining whether it should assert jurisdiction with due
regard for international comity does not involve a "policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. '7 5 In its bare essen-
tials, the inquiry is a judicial, not political, function.
Second, while the jurisdictional rule of reason offers only imprecise
formulations of the relevant criteria, the matter is not nonjusticiable
because of a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving" the controversy.76 The common thread running
through this balancing approach is "reasonableness. ' 77 While the cri-
71. Sandage, supra note 44, at 1700.
72. Relevant indicia of a nonjusticiable question include:
[1] [W]hether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; [2] the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due to
coordinate branches of government; [3] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the controversy; [and] [4] embarrassment of our
government abroad, or grave disturbance at home.
Paul M. Bator et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System 288-92 (3d ed. 1988). See
also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
73. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211-12.
74. Id. at 217.
75. Id. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969).
76. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 117-26; Fox, supra note 46, at 50.
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teria employed in the jurisdictional rule of reason may require clarifi-
cation, their purpose is simply to achieve the most reasonable result in
a particular case-a rather mundane and commonplace judicial stan-
dard that is both discoverable and manageable.
Third, the practical difficulties, noted in Laker Airways, of courts
procuring discovery abroad in the antitrust context differ in degree
rather than kind from that of other complex international litigation.
Difficulties have persistently arisen from efforts to secure evidence
located in one state for use in a legal proceeding in another state. 8
"The United States has been increasingly liberal... in permitting
domestic litigants to obtain evidence abroad," leading other states to
resist such action on the ground that it infringes their perceived sover-
eign interests.79 As one treatise put it, "unilateral extraterritorial U.S.
discovery efforts have produced some of the most contentious disputes
that have arisen in international civil litigation. ' ' 0 Such practical dif-
ficulties led states to seek a resolution by adopting the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, which provides a framework for gathering
evidence in one contracting state for use in the courts of another con-
tract state."'
Finally, Laker Airways' contention that "there is no evidence that
interest balancing represents a rule of international law"82 is in ten-
sion with Judge Fitzmaurice's separate opinion in Barcelona Traction
that international law obligates every state to "exercise moderation
and restraint as to the extent of its jurisdiction... in cases having a
foreign element" so as to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction
78. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. IML 1978); Corning
Glass Works v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., OLG Miinchen, 10/31/80, 1981
Juristenzeitung 538, 540, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1025, 1049 (1981) (pursuant to article 23 of
the Hague Evidence Convention, German court denied request for production of specified
documents); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. at 436-37 (United States district court
letters rogatory refused by British House of Lords as an unacceptable invasion of British
sovereignty).
On obtaining evidence abroad, see generally Bruno Ristau, International Judicial Assistance
(1986); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Some Reflections on Transnational Discovery, 8 J. Comp. Bus.
& Cap. Market L. 419 (1986); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation,
Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239 (1986); Martin
Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters: Several Notes Concerning Its Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L
& Pol. 1031 (1984).
79. 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, ch. 7, subch. A, Introductory Note. See supra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
80. Born & Westin, supra note 33, at 261.
81. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, March 1-July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
82. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950.
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properly exercised by another state.8 3 One wonders how a court exer-
cises moderation and restraint absent some balancing of interests to
determine whether jurisdiction is properly exercised.
In sum, while the jurisdictional rule of reason has its weaknesses, it
will remain a lasting fixture on the legal landscape precisely because it
represents the only genuine, though inexact, attempt by courts to
fashion a jurisdictional test which incorporates the legitimate sover-
eignty interests of foreign nations. Thus, in the United States, courts
generally will inquire first into whether jurisdiction may be invoked
under the effects doctrine and second whether jurisdiction should be
invoked in light of international comity concerns. We turn now to
legislative measures which, while clarifying the content of the effects
doctrine, have somewhat obscured its relationship to the comity
analysis.
B. Legislative Contributions: The Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982
Given that the courts were unable to agree on the appropriate
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws, it was hoped that a
legislative solution might be able to simplify the matter. To that end,
Congress adopted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 ("FTAIA"),84 which established a uniform test for determining
the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.8 5 The FTAIA modified
the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act to make it inapplicable to
transactions involving foreign commerce (other than import trade or
commerce) unless there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect" on domestic or import commerce, or export commerce
engaged in by domestic undertakings.8 6
While the FTAIA significantly modifies the effects doctrine within
83. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 105 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988).
85. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 815 (9th Cir. 1988).
86. The precise wording of the Act provides:
Sections I to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign
nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations,
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions [of this Act] other than this
section.
If [this Act] appl[ies] to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph
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U.S. antitrust law, one of the most important aspects of the Act is
what it does not cover. The FTAIA expressly does not apply to con-
duct involving import trade or commerce. Thus, on its face, the
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" test of the FTAIA
does not apply "to the types of activity by foreign firms... that are
most likely to create international tensions; for example... [transna-
tional] export cartels from foreign nations into the United States." 7
Second, the FTAIA provides, "in effect, that foreign consumers and
competitors injured by [anticompetitive activity] in foreign nations
cannot invoke U.S. antitrust laws.""" This comports with the
Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp. where the Court stated that "[r]espondents can-
not recover antitrust damages based solely on an alleged cartelization
of the Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do not regu-
late the competitive conditions of other nations' economies."89 Like-
wise, in the first case decided under the FTAIA, the U.S. district
court in Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Ina dismissed, for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of action, a
treble damage action by German distributor Eurim-Pharm against
American Pfizer and its European subsidiaries based on Pfizer's
method of distribution in the European market.90 The court noted
that Congress clearly "intended to exempt from United States anti-
trust law conduct that lacks the requisite domestic effect, even where
such conduct originates in the United States or involves American-
owned entities operating abroad." 91 Significantly, this limitation cur-
(1)(B), then [this Act] shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business
in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1988) for virtually identical language applica-
ble to the Federal Trade Commission Act.
87. Fox, supra note 46, at 62.
88. Id.
89. 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986). See also 1L.1 Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1982)
(foreign firm whose nondomestic operations were injured by unlawful conduct of a United
States exporter has no remedy under U.S. antitrust laws).
90. Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
91. Id. See also McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 813-15 (dismissing claim alleging refusals in
exclusive distributorship because allegations were only of injury to customers located in
Southeast Asia); The "In" Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 500
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (dismissing claim of French corporation against U.S. supplier for breach of
exclusive distributorship agreement for failure to state a claim); Papst Motoren Gmbh v.
Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864, 868-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing
antitrust counterclaim alleging anticompetitive conduct restricting sales of computer motors in
Japan despite the fact that plaintiff's motors were ultimately sold in the U.S. by another
Japanese company); Liamuga Tours, Ltd. v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920, 924-
25 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding no jurisdiction where anticompetitive effect is solely on foreign
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tails the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond that traditionally
required by international law. 92 Under the nationality principle,
international law clearly recognizes the right of the United States to
assert jurisdiction over American enterprises located abroad. How-
ever, by virtue of the FTAIA the United States chose not to exercise
that right, presumably because U.S. antitrust laws were not intended
to promote world competition or to regulate foreign markets, but
rather to protect against anticompetitive activities adversely affecting
the domestic market.
It is also unclear whether the FTAIA's "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable" test supersedes the Timberlane/Mannington
Mills test or incorporates a "jurisdictional rule of reason." The legis-
lative history of the FTAIA indicates that the Act was not intended
to have any effect on a court's ability to employ notions of interna-
tional comity.93 Accordingly, courts have continued to apply the
Timberlane/Mannington Mills balancing approach since enactment of
the FTAIA,94 and the Justice Department in its own enforcement
proceedings performs a secondary comity analysis only after jurisdic-
tion has been established under the "direct, substantial, and reason-
ably foreseeable" effects test.95
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit, which handed down the
Timberlane decision, applied the jurisdictional test of the FTAIA in
McGlinchy, noting that "prior to the enactment of [the FTAIA], the
extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws was governed in this Circuit
by [the Timberlane test]."96  Thus, McGlinchy suggests that
Timberlane was limited in some respect by enactment of the FTAIA.
In a similar manner, Professor Hawk has argued:
A sensitive application of the direct, substantial, and reason-
ably foreseeable (anticompetitive) effect test affords an
implicit recognition of foreign interests through a critical
and skeptical examination whether the Sherman Act policy
market and effect on U.S. commerce is beneficial or competitively neutral); United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 604 F. Supp. 256, 261 (D.D.C. 1984) (all the products and services were to
be sold outside the U.S.).
92. See 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 415 cmt. c; Fox, supra note 46, at 70-71.
93. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2431, 2498 [hereinafter House Rep. 686].
94. See O.N.E. Shipping, Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 451-
54 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988); Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North
American Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
95. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 55 ATRR Special
Supp. § 5 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Guidelines].
96. McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 813-14 n.8.
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objectives would be furthered by exercise of jurisdiction.
The recent willingness of courts to dismiss antitrust claims
before trial indicates that the effect test provides a useful,
albeit imperfect vehicle to minimize conflicts with foreign
nations.97
Notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether the "direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable" test of the FTAIA effectively serves, as
Professor Hawk suggests, as an alternative to the traditional comity
analysis. For one thing, the FTAIA's test focuses exclusively on find-
ing a sufficiently close nexus with the United States to justify the
assertion of jurisdiction. Nowhere does it consider the legitimate for-
eign sovereignty interests of another country that may have concur-
rent jurisdiction. As one commentator put it, "the nature and
intensity of the United States' interest in regulating extraterritorial
conduct cannot alone determine the proper limits on extraterritorial
jurisdiction." 98 This is precisely what the Ninth Circuit emphasized
in Timberlane: although a country may have jurisdiction whenever a
sufficient number of connecting factors are present, Timberlane recog-
nized that a state should nevertheless refuse to exercise jurisdiction if
the regulatory interests it is pursuing are outweighed by the interests
of one or more foreign states likely to be seriously injured by the
assertion of such jurisdiction.99 It is clear that the direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect test considers only questions ofjuris-
dictional nexus, without reference to international comity. This may
explain the Ninth Circuit's dictum in McGlinchy that, in adopting the
FrAIA, "Congress did not change the ability of the courts to exercise
principles of international comity." 1"
Thus, there is now a two-tiered test for the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws. First, there is a statutory standard for
determining whether there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable" effect on United States commerce such that jurisdiction
is permissible. Grafted on to this is the second-tier, a common law
analysis of whether, in light of international comity concerns, jurisdic-
tion should be exercised under the instant facts.
97. 1 Barry E. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A
Comparative Guide 150 (2d ed. 1989).
98. Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1310, 1320 (1985) [hereinafter Predictability and Comity].
99. See Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78
Am. . Int'l L. 783, 784-85 (1984).
100. McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 814 n.8 (citing House Rep. 686, supra note 93).
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C. Executive Contributions: The Justice Department's Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
The Justice Department's 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations endorsed the "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect" test to use in antitrust enforcement pro-
ceedings against anticompetitive conduct adversely affecting mergers,
acquisitions, and import commerce. 10' This test comports with the
Justice Department's goal of protecting U.S. consumers from
restraints that raise prices or limit consumers' choice of imported and
domestic products. 10 2 The Justice Department also has shown some
sensitivity to comity concerns in its enforcement of antitrust laws.
Section 5 of the Guidelines states that "in determining whether it
would be reasonable to assert jurisdiction or to seek particular reme-
dies in a given case, the Department considers whether significant
interests of any foreign sovereign would be affected and asserts juris-
diction only when the Department concludes that it would be reason-
able to do so. '' 0° Thus, the Justice Department's approach appears,
at least until recently, to be wholly consistent with traditional U.S.
jurisprudence on the subject: asserting jurisdiction through a moder-
ate effects test which incorporates concerns for international comity.
In an unexpected development, however, the Justice Department
on April 3, 1992 announced that it will enforce its antitrust laws on
the basis of harm to United States exports, irrespective of whether
there is direct harm to U.S. consumers.' °4 The Justice Department
was careful to note that this new policy in "no way affects existing
101. See Guidelines, supra note 95, § 4, at S-21.
102. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Anticompetitive
Conduct that Restricts U.S. Exports, April 3, 1992 (unpublished manuscript on file with
author) [hereinafter Antitrust Enforcement Policy].
103. Guidelines, supra note 95, § 5.
104. See Department of Justice Policy Regarding Anticompetitive Conduct that Restricts
U.S. Exports: Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, April 3, 1992 (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Export Enforcement Policy]. The new policy
states in relevant part:
The Department of Justice will, in appropriate cases, take antitrust enforcement
action against conduct occurring overseas that restrains United States exports,
whether or not there is direct harm to U.S. consumers, where it is clear that:
(1) the conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
exports of goods or services from the United States;
(2) the conduct involves anticompetitive activities which violate the U.S. antitrust
laws - in most cases, group boycotts, collusive pricing, and other exclusionary
activities; and
(3) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign persons or corporations engaged in
such conduct.
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laws or established principles of personal jurisdiction" and that it
would continue to consider "principles of international comity when
making antitrust enforcement decisions that may significantly affect
another government's legitimate interests."' '
The Justice Department maintains that its new policy is consistent
with existing law and specifically with the express terms of the
FTAIA. ' 6 As noted earlier, the FTAIA states that the Sherman Act
"shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commere ... with
foreign nations unless... such conduct has a direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect... on export trade or export commerce
with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce
in the United States."' 7 But the Justice Department fails to mention
that courts interpreting the FTAIA have uniformly concluded that
for an export injury claim to be cognizable, there must be evidence of
harm to U.S. consumers. Thus, in McGlinchy, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a claim alleging antitrust violations resulting
from an exclusive distribution agreement in Southeast Asia of prod-
ucts exported from the United States.108 The court found that even if
plaintiffs' allegations were true, the only injury was to the exporters
and to customers located in Southeast Asia, and that would not sat-
isfy the requirements of the FTAIA.109 Likewise, in Eurim-Pharm
GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc, the court, interpreting the FTAIA, found that
Congress "intended to exempt from United States antitrust law con-
duct that lacks the requisite domestic effect, even where such conduct
originates in the United States or involves American-owned entities
operating abroad.''I'
105. Id.
106. Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 102, at 2. The Justice Department also
argues that its new policy comports with the Supreme Court's dictum in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc. that "[o]nce Zenith demonstrated that its exports from the United
States had been restrained by [foreign patent] pool activities, the treble.damage liability of the
domestic company participating in the conspiracy was beyond question." Id. See Hazeltine
Research, 395 U.S. at 113-14 n.8. See also Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 883 ("A restraint that directly
or substantially affects the flow of commerce into or out of the United States is within the scope
of the Sherman Act.") (emphasis added). But in Hazeltine Research, the Supreme Court did
not indicate whether this conclusion was based on a finding of harm to U.S. consumers. Nor
did the Supreme Court indicate whether it asserted jurisdiction over the domestic producer
based on the territoriality principle, the nationality principle, or the efrects doctrine. Thus, it is
unclear whether the Supreme Court would recognize an approach which asserts jurisdiction
based on the effects doctrine absent a showing of harm to U.S. consumers.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
108. McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 805, 815.
109. See id. at 815 (holding that appellants' claims relate only to foreign commerce without
requisite domestic anticompetitive effect).
110. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 593 F. Supp. at 1106. See also Liamuiga Tours, 617 F. Supp. at
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The new policy is significant in that it establishes the Justice
Department's willingness to enforce U.S. antitrust laws extraterritori-
ally not only on the traditional ground of adverse impact to U.S. con-
sumers, but also under the dubious rationale that antitrust laws are
concerned with protecting domestic producers. It is axiomatic that
antitrust laws are enacted for "the protection of competition, not com-
petitors,""' and it is difficult to find a proper rationale for regulating
foreign anticompetitive activity absent evidence of direct or indirect
harm to U.S. consumers. One may surmise that a possible rationale
for the new policy is the protection of competition generally, whether
in the United States or abroad. Attorney General William P. Barr, in
his comments on the new policy, stated that "[o]ur antitrust laws are
designed to preserve and foster competition, and in today's global
economy competition is international."'"12 But this rationale contra-
dicts the Supreme Court's view, noted earlier, that "American anti-
trust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations'
economies."' 1 3 Thus, enforcing the Sherman Act on the basis of
harm to export commerce may serve as a means to protect American
competitors under the guise of enhancing international competition.
Predictably, U.S. trading partners have protested this interpretation
of the Sherman Act as exceeding the jurisdictional limits imposed by
international law." 4
This new policy has profound implications for the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws. Under this approach, the effects
test no longer requires a showing of direct, substantial, and reason-
ably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. Rather, a mere showing of
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. export
trade is sufficient. Clearly, the jurisdictional nexus is easier to satisfy
under such a test, for the universe of extraterritorial activities affect-
ing U.S. exports is manifestly broader than that of conduct harming
924-25 (no jurisdiction will lie if anticompetitive effect is felt solely in the foreign market and
the effect on U.S. commerce is beneficial or neutral).
111. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis added). See
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 n.49 (1984); A.A. Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 494
U.S. 1019 (1990); Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399
(7th Cir. 1989).
112. See Department of Justice Will Challenge Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under
Antitrust Laws, April 3, 1992 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter
Restraints on U.S. Exports].
113. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986).
114. Japan in particular has argued that such a policy may exceed the traditional bases of
international jurisdiction. See Washington Stands Firm on Anti-Trust Decision, Fin. Times,
April 16, 1992, at 7.
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U.S. consumers. Moreover, enforcing the Sherman Act on the basis
of harm to U.S. exports will give rise to greater instances of concur-
rent jurisdiction-with the United States having a secondary interest.
As James Rill, Assistant Attorney General noted, "[i]n most cases
conduct that harms our exporters also harms foreign consumers, and
may be actionable under the other country's antitrust laws.""' 5 A
typical example is a foreign cartel directed at the foreign country's
market. Such a cartel will directly and primarily harm those consum-
ers purchasing in the market, while only indirectly and secondarily
harming U.S. exporters seeking entry or enhanced activity in that
market. Both the foreign antitrust authorities and, under the new pol-
icy, the United States will have jurisdiction to enforce their respective
antitrust laws against the anticompetitive activity.
Thus, the role of comity will be especially important in this context
to ensure that due regard is given to the legitimate interests of the
foreign antitrust authorities in their primary role of fostering competi-
tion within their borders. In sum, from the international perspective,
the United States has taken two steps forward by reformulating and
improving the effects test with a requisite showing of direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect, but it recently has taken one
step back by unnecessarily expanding what falls within its jurisdic-
tional purview by enforcing the Sherman Act on the basis of harm to
U.S. exports absent harm to U.S. consumers.
D. Scholarly Contributions: The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law
No discussion of the extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust law would be complete without discussing the recent revi-
sions incorporated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law (the "Restatement"). While a restatement is not a formal source
of law, it generally seeks to state the law already in existence and, as
such, has an impact on judicial and diplomatic practice rarely
matched by any other nonbinding pronouncements."16
The fundamental thread running through the framework of the
Restatement on extraterritorial jurisdictional issues is that of "reason-
ableness." ' As noted by the Restatement reporters: "[t]erritoriality
and nationality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to prescribe,
115. Restraints on U.S. Exports, supra note 112, at 3.
116. Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 47 (Summer 1987).
117. Fox, supra note 46, at 65.
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but in determining their meaning rigid concepts have been replaced
by broader criteria embracing principles of reasonableness and fair-
ness to accommodate overlapping or conflicting interests of states,
and affected private interests."118
Of particular relevance for our purposes are Sections 402 and 403
(containing the general provisions on the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction) and Section 415 (which specifically addresses the extra-
territorial assertion of jurisdiction in the context of antitrust law).1 19
Section 402, in addition to adopting the territoriality, nationality, and
protective principles, specifically endorses the effects doctrine: "a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to... (1)(c) con-
duct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory .... ,,120 Thus, the Restatement provides a
basis for jurisdiction where there is an actual effect or an intended but
thwarted effect within a territory. 12 1
Section 403 limits Section 402 by imposing restrictions on jurisdic-
tion where the assertion of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. What is
deemed "reasonable" must be determined in light of the eight criteria
set forth in Section 403(2).122 Moreover, where the assertion of juris-
diction is reasonable, but conflicts with the legitimate exercise ofjuris-
118. 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, part IV, ch. 1, subch. A, Introductory Note.
119. Id. §§ 402, 403 & 415.
120. Id. § 402(l)(c). Section 402 provides:
Subject to Section 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed
against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
Id.
121. Id. § 402 cmt. d.
122. Id. § 403. Section 403 provides:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under Section 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, le., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
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diction by another state, each state has an obligation to evaluate its
own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction and
defer where the other state's interest is clearly greater. 23
Finally, the Restatement contains a special provision relevant to
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. Section 415 applies the
general principles of Sections 402 and 403 to regulation by the United
States of anticompetitive conduct occurring abroad. 24 Again, the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be reasonable. Section
415 considers the exercise of jurisdiction in the antitrust context to be
reasonable if: (1) the agreement is made in the United States, or car-
ried out in significant measure there; or (2) a principal purpose of the
conduct or agreement is to interfere with the United States commerce
and it has "some effect" on United States commerce; or (3) the intent
is unclear but the agreement or conduct has substantial effect on
United States commerce.12 Thus, jurisdiction may be based on terri-
toriality or the effects doctrine. In the latter case, jurisdiction is based
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction
over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each
state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other states interest in
exercising jurisdiction in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state
should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
Id.
123. Id. § 403(3).
124. Id. § 415 cmt. a.
125. Id. § 415. Section 415 provides:
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in the United
States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is carried out in
significant measure in the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of
the United States, regardless of the nationality or place of business of the parties to
the agreement or of the participants in the conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of the
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is carried
out predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction to
prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the conduct or agreement is
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on a combination of intent and effect: where the principal purpose is
to interfere with United States commerce, the effect need not be sub-
stantial, but must not be insignificant; where there is no principal
purpose to interfere or the intent is unclear, the effect must be
"substantial."1 26
The Restatement and the FTAIA, therefore, appear to approach
the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law from a
similar perspective. As Professor Fox has noted, "[t]here is ... no
essential conflict between the Restatement and the [FTAIA] stat-
ute." 127 The only significant difference is that, in the case of anticom-
petitive activity affecting domestic or export commerce (not import
commerce) the FTAIA requires only evidence of a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect, whereas the Restatement Section
415(2) would consider whether the agreement had as a principle pur-
pose the interference with United States commerce and whether it
had some effect on that commerce.128 What is noteworthy, however,
is the Restatement's explicit recognition and treatment of interna-
tional comity concerns in Section 403 and the FTAIA drafters' con-
scious decision to leave such comity concerns to the courts. 129 This
reflects the Restatement's attempt to codify the dominant trends of
U.S. antitrust law in their totality by including not only the legisla-
tively modified effects test but also the judicially created notions of
international comity.
In sum, U.S. courts have reached a consensus on the appropriate
test for the extraterritorial assertion of U.S. antitrust laws: in addi-
tion to the territorial principle, the direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect doctrine provides a basis for asserting jurisdiction in
the absence of overriding comity concerns. The importance, however,
to be given these comity concerns and the precise criteria to be uti-
to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and the agreement or conduct
has some effect on that commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are subject to the
jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or conduct have
substantial effect on the commerce of the United States and the exercise of
jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
Id.
126. Id. § 415 cmt. a; Fox, supra note 46, at 70.
127. Fox, supra note 46, at 71. See also I Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 415
Reporter's Note 8 ("It appears that [FTAIA] amendments are not inconsistent with
Subsection (3) of this section . . ").
128. See 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 415 reporters' note 8.
129. Compare 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 403(3) with House Rep. 686, supra
note 93, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2498 (Act not intended to have any effect on
a court's ability to employ notions of comity).
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lized in analyzing these competing interests are less defined and are
subject to debate and disagreement in the various courts of appeals.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY APPROACH
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, establishing the basic rules
on EC competition law, do not contain an explicit rule of jurisdiction
defining their sphere of application.1 30  Article 85 prohibits "any
agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations ...
[and] concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the
Member States and which have as their object or result the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market." 131 Article 86 provides that "action by one or more enter-
prises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the
Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to
be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be pro-
hibited." 132 Some have argued that the substantive rule of article
85-that a restrictive practice have as its "object or result the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market" ' 33-- implies an approach to jurisdiction which focuses on the
effects of a restrictive agreement.1 34 Others argue that such an inter-
pretation would be reading too much into the language of the Treaty
and that the territoriality principle alone provides a sufficient basis to
assert jurisdiction. 35 This section will begin by analyzing the Euro-
pean Commission's approach and will then consider how the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has addressed the issue. 36
130. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 47-48 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. See Van Gerven, supra note 11, at 458.
131. EEC Treaty, supra note 130, art. 85.
132. Id. art. 86.
133. Id. art. 85.
134. See Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5215 ('IT]he vast majority of academic writers take the
view that it is neither the nationality nor the geographical location of the undertaking but the
location of the anti-competitive effect which constitutes the criterion for the application of
Community competition law.") (citation omitted); Van Gerven, supra note 11, at 459.
135. See Wood Pulp, 1988 F.C.I at 5206 (United Kingdom argued that the territoriality
principle permits jurisdiction to be asserted over foreign undertakings having subsidiaries or
agents within the Community).
136. Under the Community competition procedure, the Commission is effectively the
tribunal of first inquiry in that it makes the initial investigation and decision as to the
compatibility with articles 85 and 86 of an agreement or activity. See EEC Treaty, supra note
130, arts. 85 & 86. Commission decisions may be appealed to the recently instituted European
Court of First Instance. Because this court was only recently created, however, it has yet to
render a decision on extraterritorial application of competition laws, thus explaining the
noticeable absence of any discussion of this court in the overview that follows. Finally,
decisions by the Court of First Instance may be appealed to the European Court of Justice.
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A. Contribution of the European Commission
The Commission has from the inception of EC competition law
asserted Community jurisdiction on the basis of anticompetitive
effects. 137 In Grosfillex, the first decision under the competition rules,
the Commission reasoned that the "territorial scope of [the competi-
tion laws] is determined neither by the domicile of the enterprises nor
by... where the agreement is concluded or carried out. On the con-
trary, the sole and decisive criterion is whether an agreement...
affects competition within the Common Market or is designed to have
this effect." 138 Citing Grosfillex, the Commission stated in its Elev-
enth Report on Competition Policy that "[tihe Commission was one
of the first antitrust authorities to have applied the internal effect the-
ory to foreign companies."139 The Commission was even more
explicit in Aniline Dyes Cartel, stating that "[t]his decision is applica-
ble to all the undertakings which took part in the concerted practices,
whether they are established within or outside the Common Mar-
ket.... The competition rules of the Treaty are, consequently, appli-
cable to all restrictions of competition which produce within the
Common Market effects set out in Article 85 (1).11140 Most recently,
the Commission's decision in Wood Pulp, later affirmed by the Court
of Justice under different reasoning, stated that:
Prior to the creation of the Court of First Instance, Commission decisions were appealable
directly to the European Court of Justice.
137. See, e.g., Grosfllex-Fillistorf, 1964 J.O. (58) 915, 3 C.M.L.R. 237 (1964); Mertens &
Straet-Bendix, 1964 J.O. (92) 1426.
138. Boaz Barack, The Application of the Competition Rules (Antitrust Law) of the
European Economic Community to Enterprises and Arrangements External to the Common
Market 98-99 (1981). See Grosfillex, 3 C.M.L.R. at 238-39, where the Commission noted that:
The contract concluded between the undertakings... has the aim of granting ... an
exclusive concession of the sale of its article for a territory situated outside the
Common Market. The object of the contract is thus not to prevent, restrict or distort
competition within the Common Market. However... [w]e should ... examine
whether the contract does not have the effect ... of preventing, restricting or
distorting competition within the Common Market within the meaning of [a]rticle 85
(1).
139. Commission of the European Communities, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy
36, V 35 (1981) [hereinafter Eleventh Report]. See also Commission of the European
Communities, Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy 59, 60 (1984) (Commission's
decision in Eastern Aluminium and Wood Pulp "reflects the policy, which is essential in view
of the realities of modem world trade, that all undertakings doing business within the EEC
must respect the rules of competition in the same way, regardless of their place of
establishment ('effects doctrine')"); ICI v. Commission ("Dyestuffs"), 1972 E.C.R. 619, 629
(Commission argues that jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of economic
effects that claimant's conduct has produced in the Common Market; this accords with the
previous practice of the Commission from its decisions in, inter alia, Grosfillex).
140. Aniline Dyes Cartel, 1969 J.O. (L 195) 11, 8 C.M.L.R. D23, D33 (1969).
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Article 85 of the EEC Treaty applies to restrictive practices
which may affect trade between member-states even if the
undertakings and associations which are parties to the
restrictive practices are established or have their headquar-
ters outside the Community, and even if the restrictive prac-
tices in question also affect markets outside the EEC.14
Accordingly, jurisdiction was held to be proper because the effect of
the agreements on the Common Market was substantial and intended,
and was the primary and direct result of such practices.1 42 Thus, the
Commission has accepted a modified and moderately narrower U.S.
effects doctrine, limiting jurisdiction to instances of internal effects
within the Common Market.
As for international comity concerns, the Commission has, at least
on one occasion, expressed a willingness to utilize a balancing
approach reminiscent of the Timberlane/Mannington Mills approach
in U.S. antitrust law. In Eastern Aluminium, the Commission, while
recognizing that there is no prohibitive rule of international law
which prevents the application of Community law to defendants situ-
ated outside the Community, nevertheless acknowledged that EC
undertakings might be required to act in a way contrary to the
requirements of its domestic laws or that the application of Commu-
nity law might adversely affect important sovereignty interests of a
third country.143 Thus, the Commission implicitly recognized that
there may be cases where comity interests outweigh the EC's funda-
mental interest against distorted competition."4 It also suggests that
the Commission is aware that the finding of relevant effects within the
Common Market is not necessarily the final step in the assertion of
prescriptive jurisdiction. 145 Nevertheless, the Commission has never
141. Wood Pulp, 1985 03. (L 85) 1, 14-15, 54 C.M.LR. 474,499-500 (1985), aff'd in part,
void in part, 1988 E.C.R 5193.
142. See id.
143. Eastern Aluminium, 1985 03. (L 92) 1, 48; Christopher Bellamy & Graham D. Child,
Common Market Law of Competition 119-20 n.26 (3d ed. 1987).
144. See Eastern Aluminium, 1985 03. (L 92) at 48, where the Commission held that:
The exercise ofjurisdiction. .. does not require any of the undertakings concerned to
act in any way contrary to the requirements of their domestic laws, nor would the
application of Community law adversely affect important interests of a non-member
State. Such an interest would have to be so important as to prevail over the
fundamental interest of the Community that competition within the common market
is not distorted .... 
145. Kurt Stockmann, Foreign Application of European Antitrust Laws, 1985 Fordham
Corp. L. Inst. 251, 266 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986). Similarly, in the Eleventh Report on
Competition Policy, the Commission stated that it was willing to consider the truly important
and harmful effects on foreign states in its determination of whether the assertion of
1992]
30 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
actually undertaken such a balancing approach.
B. Contribution of the European Court of Justice
The Court of Justice has only rarely addressed the issue of the
extraterritorial application of EC competition law. In one of the earli-
est decisions on the matter, the Court in Beguelin stated in dictum
that "[tlhe fact that one of the undertakings which are parties to the
agreement is situated in a third country does not prevent application
of [article 85] since the agreement is operative on the territory of the
common market." '146 Standing alone, this may suggest that the Court
will look to where the agreement is operating to determine whether it
may assert jurisdiction over the undertakings. However, in Beguelin
some of the parties to the agreement were established within the Com-
munity, and thus the Court based jurisdiction on the territorial princi-
ple. The decision, moreover, appears to treat the "effects" of the
conduct as synonymous with the "results" of the prohibited activi-
ties.147 Accordingly, most observers have concluded that the Beguelin
judgment provides insufficient authority to conclude that the Court
has accepted the "effects doctrine."148
Such a conclusion is bolstered by the Court's decision in Dyestuffs,
where it specifically declined to adopt the effects doctrine as suggested
by Advocate General Mayras, 149 and instead asserted jurisdiction on
the basis of territoriality. Specifically, the Court asserted jurisdiction
over the foreign undertakings by arguing that the subsidiary compa-
jurisdiction is proper. Eleventh Report, supra note 139, at 37, V 37; Meessen, supra note 99, at
797.
146. Case 22/71, Beguelin Import v. G.L. Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949, 959.
147. Barack, supra note 138, at 109.
148. See Eleventh Report, supra note 139, at 36, 35; Noel L. Allen, The Development of
European Community Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Alien Undertakings, 2 Legal Issues of Eur.
Integration 35, 58, 71 (1974); F. A. Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 22 Int'l Comp. L.Q. 35, 49 n.48 (1973).
149. Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.R. at 693-96 (Mayras view that the Court should adopt effects test
as basis for exercising jurisdiction based on direct, immediate, foreseeable and substantial
effects).
Under the Community judicial system, an Advocate General serves a role analogous to the
commissaire du gouvernement in the procedure of the French Conseil d'Etat. See Derrick
Wyatt & Alan Dashwood, The Substantive Laws of the EEC 82-83 (2d ed. 1987). Although
not technically a judge, the Advocate General presents his own independent and impartial
opinion on the case after the parties have concluded their written and oral submissions and
prior to the European Court of Justice's deliberations on the case. Id. Thus, the Advocate
General's opinion helps frame the issues, provides an initial reasoned opinion, and, in the great
majority of cases, its reasoning to the facts is followed closely in the Court's subsequent
judgment. In addition, the Advocate General's opinions are published in the European Court
Reports, thus providing a basis for authority in future cases. Id.
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nies located within the EC were in fact part of the same "economic
entity" as the parent companies located abroad. The Court in essence
went beyond the facade of the separate legal personalities of parent
and subsidiary companies and pierced the corporate veil so as to treat
the parent and subsidiary as a single economic entity. It then imputed
the conduct of the subsidiary established within the Community to
the parent company located outside the Community. 50
Surprisingly, in adopting the economic entity doctrine, the Court
did not even consider the effects doctrine, although the decision under
review was based on it,'5 ' the parties had argued before the Court at
length on the merits of the effects doctrine, and the Advocate General
explicitly encouraged the Court to adopt the doctrine.152 As Profes-
sor Mann aptly noted, "the Court succeeded in avoiding the decision
of a great problem of international law argued before it, refrained
from any pronouncement upon them or upon any question of interna-
tional law, and travelled its own independent and unexpected
road."153
The so-called "economic entity" doctrine established in Dyestuffs
can hardly be seen as a satisfactory or final ruling on the matter of
extraterritorial jurisdiction of EC competition law. First, the decision
fails to respect the independent legal personalities of the companies
concerned and finds parental control over subsidiaries on remarkably
little evidence. More importantly, the doctrine provides no basis for
asserting jurisdiction over foreign undertakings that have no subsidi-
aries established within the Community. The conduct of such entities
is strictly beyond the reach of the Community institutions under the
economic entity doctrine. Thus, Dyestuffs deferred to another day the
difficult question of how to assert jurisdiction over a company that
has no legal nexus with an undertaking within the Community. That
question was finally addressed in Wood Pulp.'5
The Court's decision in Wood Pulp, without a doubt, constitutes
the most important decision to date on the extraterritorial application
of EC competition law. In Wood Pulp, numerous wood pulp produ-
cers and two wood pulp producer associations, all having their regis-
tered offices outside the Community, allegedly infringed article 85 of
the EEC Treaty.155 They allegedly did so through the establishment
150. See Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.RL at 661-63.
151. Aniline Dyes Cartel, 3 C.M.L.R. at D33.
152. .Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.R. at 630, 693-96.
153. Mann, supra note 148, at 112.
154. Wood Pulp, 1988 F-C.R. at 5193.
155. Id. at 5197-98.
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of a horizontal price-fixing agreement implemented by means of set
prices charged to Community customers, price recommendations by
the wood pulp associations, and exchange of individualized price
data. 156
The Commission's earlier decision in Wood Pulp had adopted the
"effects doctrine," concluding that the effect of the agreements and
practices on prices was not only substantial but intended and was the
primary and direct result of such agreements and practices.'5 7 The
applicants argued that the Commission's decision was "incompatible
with public international law on the grounds that the application of
the competition rules in this case was founded exclusively on the eco-
nomic repercussions within the common market of conduct restrict-
ing competition which was adopted outside the Community."' 58 The
United Kingdom expressed the strongest opposition to the "effects
doctrine." It encouraged the Court to assert jurisdiction by extending
the economic entity doctrine of Dyestuffs to "cases in which an under-
taking established outside the Community employs an agent within
the Community."' 5 9 In such instances, "jurisdiction exercised.., is
not extraterritorial [but] fully consistent with the territorial principle
as explained in the jurisprudence of the Court."'"
Advocate General Darmon reasoned that article 85 "offers general
support for the proposition that Community competition law is appli-
cable, by its very essence, whenever anti-competitive effects have been
produced within the territory of the Community."' 6' He distin-
guished Dyestuffs and Beguelin by noting that, because the Court of
Justice was able to resolve those jurisdictional questions on more nar-
row grounds, nothing could be made either positively or negatively of
the Court's failure to speak clearly on the legitimacy of the effects
doctrine.' 62 Then, after concluding that the effects doctrine was in
conformity with the requirements and practice of international law,
156. Id. at 5196-97.
157. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. The Commission was ambiguous in its
written submissions to the Court of Justice, stating that the basis of jurisdiction was not the
"effects doctrine" but was based on the implementation of the agreement affecting competition
directly, intentionally and appreciably within the Community. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at
5211-13.
158. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5243.
159. Id. at 5206.
160. Van Gerven, supra note 11, at 463-64 (quoting United Kingdom Written Observations,
pt. 18).
161. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5215.
162. Id. at 5216; Dieter G. F. Lange & John B. Sandage, The Wood Pulp Decision and Its
Implication for the Scope of EC Competition Law, 26 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 137, 151 (1989).
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he encouraged the Court to adopt an approach which asserted juris-
diction on the basis of the direct and immediate, reasonably foresee-
able and substantial effect of extraterritorial anticompetitive
conduct.'63 Adopting any approach short of this would, in his opin-
ion, "disarm" the Community when faced with anticompetitive con-
duct the initiative and responsibility for which was assumed
exclusively by undertakings outside the Common Market. 161
The Court of Justice rejected Advocate General Darmon's invita-
tion to adopt the effects doctrine. It first noted that the foreign under-
takings, while receiving their main sources of supply of wood pulp
outside the Community, nevertheless sell directly to purchasers estab-
lished in the Community and engage in price competition with such
Community customers. Therefore, these individual undertakings
compete within the territory of the Common Market. Furthermore,
by taking part in concertation on prices to be charged to Community
customers and putting that concertation into effect by selling at coor-
dinated prices, they are taking part in concertation that has the object
and effect of restricting competition in violation of article 85.165
Only after concluding that the Commission failed to make a correct
assessment of the territorial scope of article 85 did the Court of Jus-
tice examine whether asserting jurisdiction in this case would be
incompatible with public international law on the ground that such
jurisdiction was asserted exclusively because of adverse economic
repercussions within the Community of conduct occurring abroad.
The Court first noted that any infringement of article 85 consists of
conduct made up of two elements: the formation of the agreement
and its implementation. If the decisive element was where the agree-
ment was formed, undertakings could easily evade prohibitions.
Therefore, the Court argued that the decisive element is where the
agreement is implemented.1 66 Applying this principle, the Court
found that the undertakings implemented the agreement within the
Common Market by making contracts with purchasers within the
Community. Finally, the Court declined to examine whether the non-
interference principle exists in international law and dismissed with-
out elaboration any considerations of international comity."6
Before commenting on Wood Pulp further, it may be appropriate
163. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.RL at 5217-20, 5226.
164. Id. at 5226.
165. Id. at 5242-43.
166. Id. at 5243.
167. Id. at 5244. Under the non-interference principle, where two states each have sufficient
jurisdiction to justify application and enforcement of their respective rules, and the effect of
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briefly to mention its impact in subsequent decisions. Since the Court
of Justice's decision in Wood Pulp, the Commission has handed down
at least two decisions ordering termination of restrictive practices and
fining undertakings situated outside the Community for infringement
of article 85. In PVC, which concerned an agreement by producers
supplying bulk thermoplastic PVC in the Community to fix prices and
set target quotas, the Commission concluded that "[i]n so far as the
agreements were implemented inside the Community, the applicability
of Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty to a Norwegian producer is not
precluded by the free trade agreement between the European Eco-
nomic Community and Norway."1 68 Thus, the Commission clearly
attempted to abide by the jurisdictional limits imposed by the imple-
mentation approach of Wood Pulp. However, in LdPE, which con-
cerned an agreement of producers supplying bulk thermoplastic low-
density polyethylene to fix target prices and target quotas and operate
collusive arrangements, the Commission surprisingly exceeded the
limits imposed by Wood Pulp by asserting jurisdiction, in at least one
instance, on a straightforward "effects doctrine."'' 69 Citing Wood
Pulp, the Commission first employed the implementation approach to
assert jurisdiction over the Austrian, Finnish, and Norwegian wood
pulp producers because their agreements were implemented inside the
Community. 70 But in the case of Repsol, a Spanish undertaking
whose alleged unlawful activities occurred solely in Spain, the Com-
mission took a different approach. It argued that the fact that Rep-
sol's participation in an unlawful cartel related to the period before
Spain's accession to the Community did not exclude article 85.
Rather, the Commission reasoned that "[t]o the extent that its
involvement in the cartel affected competition within the Community,
EEC competition rules applied to Repsol."''7 Thus, while the Com-
mission asserted jurisdiction over the other non-Community under-
takings on the basis of the implementation approach, it apparently
which would be to subject a person to contradictory orders, each state has a duty to exercise its
jurisdiction with moderation. Id.
168. Decision 89/190, PVC, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 1, 14 (emphasis added). See also Decision 89/
191, LdPE, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 21, 35. On appeal, the Court of First Instance in PVC never
reached the jurisdictional question, finding instead that the Commission's decision was non-
existent due to particularly serious and manifest defects in the measure. See Joined Cases T-
79/89 etc., BASF v. Commission ("PVC"), 4 C.M.L.R. 357, paras. 99-102 (1992).
169. LdPE, 1989 O.J. (L 74) at 35.
170. Id. (Even though the wood pulp producers' production facilities and headquarters
were outside the Community, "[t]he Community is an important market for all these
producers and accounts for a quarter to a half of their total LdPE business.").
171. Id. (emphasis added).
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could not utilize this argument with Repsol because Repsol had
implemented its agreement solely in Spain prior to Spain's accession
to the Community. Thus, the Commission singled out Repsol and
asserted jurisdiction over it solely on the basis of the "effects
doctrine." 172
The Commission's action bodes ill for the future of the implementa-
tion approach. It suggests that there will continue to arise a class of
anticompetitive activities that adversely impact the Common Market,
but that are beyond the reach of Wood Pulp's implementation
approach. Examples of such activities include, inter alia: extraterri-
torial export boycotts (refusals to buy), refusals to sell to Community
purchasers, and extraterritorial agreements to restrict output such as
in LdPE where certain parties are manufacturing products outside the
Community in the hopes of raising prices within the Community.
Some have attempted to stretch the Wood Pulp implementation
approach to include not merely positive conduct within the Commu-
nity, but also omissions, such as foreign undertakings agreeing not to
export into the Common Market. 173 As one commentator put it, "the
[Court's] notion of implementation may include both a positive act
(eg., conclusion of a sale contract within EEC territory) or an omis-
sion (eg., unlawful refusal by two or more foreign undertakings or a
foreign dominant firm to supply a preexisting distributor within the
EEC)." '174 Such an extension would, in application, render the imple-
mentation approach virtually indistinguishable from the "effects doc-
trine." The Court had utilized the implementation approach to assert
jurisdiction over the wood pulp producers on the basis of the territo-
rial principle, 175 reasoning that the producers implemented their pric-
ing agreement within the Common Market through agents within the
Community who made contracts with purchasers within the Commu-
nity. It would be an unprecedented stretch of the objective territorial-
ity principle to include foreign undertakings' omissions, as such
172. The Court of First Instance is currently hearing LdPE on appeal. Hopefully, the
Court will shed more light on the Community's approach to the extraterritorial application of
its competition laws.
173. See, e.g., Jose Perez Santos, The Territorial Scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty,
1989 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 571, 575-77 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1990).
174. Theofanis Christoforou & David B. Rockwell, European Economic Community Law:
The Territorial Scope of Application of EEC Antitrust Law, 30 Harv. Int'l 14. 195, 204
(1989).
175. Wood Pulp, 1988 EC.R. at 5243 ("[P]roducers . . . implemented their pricing
agreement within the common market .... Accordingly the Community's jurisdiction to
apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered by the territoriality principle as
universally recognized in public international law.").
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failures to act (L e., refusal to sell to purchasers within the Commu-
nity) would not be in any manner physically pursued or conducted
within the Common Market. Stated differently, the objective territo-
riality principle traditionally permits a state to exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign national where a consummating act within the state's
territory was a constituent element of an agreement made abroad. 176
With omissions, there is no "consummating act within the Commu-
nity" that can justify the assertion of jurisdiction on objective territo-
rial grounds. Thus, for the implementation approach to remain
faithfud to the Community's professed desire to assert jurisdiction
solely on the basis of the territoriality principle, it appears necessary
to exclude certain traditional antitrust violations from its jurisdic-
tional purview.
The Court's cursory treatment of international comity in its juris-
dictional inquiry also gives cause for concern. Besides Wood Pulp, the
Court has alluded to international comity concerns on only one previ-
ous occasion. In IBM v. Commission, the Commission had initiated
proceedings against IBM, alleging abuse of a dominant position in
violation of article 86, because IBM did not supply sufficient informa-
tion about its data-processing equipment to enable EC competitors to
offer associated interconnected equipment. 177 In its appeal, IBM
argued, inter alia, that the Commission failed to consider principles of
international comity between nations before it initiated proceedings or
rendered a decision. 17 The Court, however, reasoned that the Com-
mission had yet to render a decision within the meaning of article 173
and therefore IBM was not yet subjected to any adverse legal conse-
quences. Its complaint was therefore inadmissible. 179 Significantly,
the Court noted in dictum that it was unnecessary to consider the
"special circumstances" of comity between nations at an early stage
such as envisaged by IBM because such circumstances would not
thereby render the complaint admissible. 180 In other words, the
Court, while not addressing the comity argument directly, indicated
that comity should not be considered as a jurisdictional threshold
inquiry. One may infer that the Court was rejecting what in U.S.
parlance is described as the second prong of the jurisdictional rule of
reason: determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised by bal-
176. Id. at 5217; Haight, supra note 7, at 640. See generally Bellamy & Child, supra note 7,
at 21.
177. Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639.
178. Id. at 2648.
179. Id. at 2655.
180. Id.
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ancing the foreign nation's sovereignty interests against the Commu-
nity's interest in regulating anticompetitive activity.
The Court's decision in Wood Pulp supports such an inference. In
Wood Pulp, the Court stated simply:
As regards the argument relating to disregard of interna-
tional comity, it suffices to observe that it amounts to calling
in question the Community's jurisdiction to apply its com-
petition rules to conduct such as that found to exist in this
case and that, as such, that argument has already been
rejected. 81
The suggestion is that if the Court may assert jurisdiction under the
territoriality approach, it must assert jurisdiction. Stated differently,
asking whether the Court should assert jurisdiction is the same as ask-
ing whether it may assert jurisdiction. Thus, the Court has no discre-
tion to refuse jurisdiction for the sake of competing concerns such as
foreign sovereignty interests or international comity. In so doing, the
Court of Justice in one sentence appears to wholly reject a doctrine
that U.S. courts have been wrestling with for over fifteen years.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As a general proposition, the United States proclaims a broad grant
of jurisdictional authority over extraterritorial activities but curtails
such authority through comity-based limitations applied at the discre-
tion of the courts. SinceAloa, the United States has asserted its right
to exercise jurisdiction to the farthest possible limits permitted by
international law'82 over foreign defendants whose anticompetitive
activities affect U.S. commerce. In response to criticisms from
abroad, however, it has sought to impose discretionary limits upon
such extraterritorial reach by building in safeguards to protect foreign
sovereignty interests through a jurisdictional rule of reason, thereby
mitigating some of the ill will engendered by a naked or unmodified
effects doctrine. Thus, the U.S. approach essentially grants courts the
right to assert jurisdiction as broadly as international law permits, but
then gives them the discretion to refuse to exercise this right in the
interest of international comity.
The European Community, by contrast, approaches the matter
from a completely different angle. The European Court of Justice
181. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244.
182. And some would say beyond the limits or international law. See supra text
accompanying notes 48-52.
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starts first from the premise that the territoriality principle is the best,
if not the only, permissible means to assert jurisdiction over foreign
defendants whose anticompetitive behavior harms the Common Mar-
ket. It has, however, eschewed a strict definition of territoriality and
has reinterpreted the objective territoriality principle to meet current
needs of regulating foreign anticompetitive activities. This was done
first through the "economic entity" approach of Dyestuffs and then
through the "implementation approach" of Wood Pulp. Both the
U.S. "broad but discretionary" approach and the European Commu-
nity "ever growing territoriality" approach raise significant, but very
different, problems.
While the theoretical rationale of the implementation approach is
distinct from the effects doctrine, there are striking similarities as to
their practical consequences. That is, though achieved by different
theoretical means, the practical result of the implementation
approach and the effects doctrine will usually be the same: the court
will assert jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. While the link to
the territory with the implementation approach is the locus of the
offending act and the link with the effects doctrine is the locus of the
resulting injury, in practice the vast majority of claims will be juris-
dictionally cognizable under either approach. 183 It is true that in cer-
tain relatively uncommon circumstances (e.g., export boycotts) the
effects doctrine casts its net wider than the implementation approach
to embrace cases involving purely foreign conduct. But in the vast
majority of cases, the same anticompetitive activity will give rise to
jurisdiction under both the effects doctrine and the implementation
approach.
This point can be seen most clearly by applying the reasoning of
Wood Pulp to the facts of Alcoa, the initial and perhaps the broadest
statement of the effects doctrine. Recall that in Alcoa, a Canadian
company along with a group of British, French, German, and Swiss
corporations formed an aluminum cartel called the "Alliance" which
imposed a production quota on its members regarding the amount of
aluminum which could be produced and subsequently imported into,
183. From an evidentiary standpoint, the two approaches are distinct. Plaintiffs under the
implementation approach are required to show some activity within the Common Market on
which to predicate jurisdiction, whereas plaintiffs under the effects doctrine must proffer
evidence of actual adverse effects on U.S. commerce. Thus, Wood Pulp is reminiscent of the
early U.S. decision of Sisal Sales, in that the emphasis is on the fact that the agreement was
"made effective by acts done" within the territory of the Common Market. See Sisal Sales, 274
U.S. at 276. Accordingly, the evidentiary focus will be on finding some activity, however
attenuated, within the territory to justify asserting jurisdiction.
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inter alia, the United States.'8 4 Any member producing more than
the specified quota was to pay a royalty to be divided among the cartel
members according to their interests in the Alliance.18 5
Applying the rationale put forth in Wood Pulp, the Community
could assert jurisdiction over members of the aluminum cartel only if
its members "implemented" their quota system within the Common
Market. It is submitted that the Community, using the implementa-
tion approach, could assert jurisdiction over the foreign defendants to
the cartel on the basis of the facts in Alcoa. An agreement is "imple-
mented" in the Community when it concerns the price, quantity, or
quality of a product sold by a non-EC seller to a buyer in the Commu-
nity.'86 The agreement would be implemented within the Community
in the sense that its members would produce and subsequently import
a specific quantity of aluminum below what they would otherwise
have produced and imported under normal market conditions. It is
thus a straightforward example of a cartel agreeing to collectively
restrict output of a product sold in a particular market in the hopes of
increasing demand and raising prices in that market. Using the lan-
guage of objective territoriality, the "consummating act within the
state's territory" would be the importation of aluminum in the terri-
tory pursuant to the production quota provisions of the cartel agree-
ment. Under the implementation approach, such importation is no
less an act within the territory than a domestic monopoly restricting
its production output in order to increase demand and thereby raise
prices in the market."8 7 Thus, quoting the Court of Justice in Wood
Pulp, one could say of the aluminum cartel that "[t]he producers in
this case implemented their [quota] agreement within the common
market. It is immaterial in that respect whether or not they had
184. While the cartel agreement was silent as to whether imports into the United States
were included in the quota system, the Court found that, in forming the cartel, all members of
the Alliance agreed that such imports should be included in the quotas. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at
443.
185. Id. at 442-43.
186. See Lange & Sandage, supra note 162, at 161.
187. One may argue that a production quota of products subsequently imported into the
United States is more of an omission, falling outside the objective territoriality approach, than
a positive act falling within its ambit. Though not beyond peradventure, a quota arguably is
better characterized as an affirmative act implemented within the territory, thus permitting
jurisdiction under Wood Pulp. If one focuses on the positive act of selling a certain agreed-
upon quantity of aluminum in the territory, rather than on the omission of failing to sell an
additional quantity of aluminum according to market demands, the conduct is more accurately
characterized as a consummating act within the territory rather than an omission or failure to
act. The matter would be different if the quota agreement called for no sales in the territory
because in that case the agreement would in no way be implemented within the territory.
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recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches within the
Community in order to make their contacts with purchasers within
the Community."1"8 In sum, even under the facts of Alcoa, the case
which most dismayed Continental skeptics, the implementation
approach would permit the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign
defendants.
Applying the facts of Alcoa to the Wood Pulp approach illustrates
that the U.S. effects doctrine and the European implementation
approach are increasingly developing along parallel lines. The effects
doctrine is continually being narrowed and qualified to require a
showing of stronger jurisdictional nexus through direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effects, while the objective territoriality
approach is being reformulated and expanded to encompass certain
activities that would fall well outside its traditional ambit. The result
is a convergence of application of EC and U.S. antitrust laws vis-a-vis
foreign defendants.
Given this convergence, one wonders why the resistance to the
effects doctrine persists while there has been virtually no challenge to
the validity, under international law, of a liberal objective territorial-
ity approach. This is particularly the case where the European Com-
munity's implementation approach may exceed the extraterritorial
reach of the United States' approach of "direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable" effects. It is clear under Wood Pulp that the
European Community may assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring
within the Common Market provided it restricts competition to an
appreciable extent.1 89 "Appreciable" connotes in this context not
"considerable" but rather "perceptible" or "noticeable."1 90 By con-
trast, after enactment of the FTAIA, U.S. courts do not have jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act unless there is a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce. 91
Thus, anticompetitive conduct which is noticeable but not substantial
could, within the European Community, give rise to jurisdiction over
foreign defendants, while not giving rise to jurisdiction in the U.S.
under the "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effects test.
188. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5243.
189. Id. at 5243-44. See also Beguelin, 1971 E.C.R. at 960 (in order to come within the
prohibition imposed by art. 85, the agreement must affect trade between Member States and
free play of competition to an appreciable extent); Bellamy & Child, supra note 143, at 122.
190. See Panel Discussion on Application of Competition Law to Foreign Conduct, 1985
Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 311, 322 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1986) (statement of Prof. Lowenfeld);
Stockmann, supra note 145, at 262 n.54A.
191. See McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 814-15; McElderry v. Cathay Pac. Airways, 678 F. Supp.
1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Moreover, unlike the U.S. effects doctrine, foreign undertakings may
offend EC competition laws solely on the basis of intent to restrain
trade in the Common Market, even absent a showing of adverse eco-
nomic repercussions on the EC market. 92 Thus, as one commentator
noted in discussing the implementation approach of Wood Pulp, "the
criteria of substantial, direct and foreseeable effects might provide
both for greater clarity and for narrower limits to the jurisdiction of
states.'
193
The Community's failure to incorporate any notions of comity in
its jurisdictional inquiry exacerbates these concerns. Thus, conduct
implemented in the EC which is intended to restrict EC competition
or which perceptibly affects EC competition will give rise to jurisdic-
tion irrespective of its adverse impact on foreign sovereignty interests.
The Court's failure to give any serious discussion to international
comity is perplexing, given that it has assumed such importance in the
jurisdictional rule of reason analysis gaining favor in the United States
and has been endorsed by leading international scholars including the
Restatement on Foreign Relations commentators and the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of National Laws.194 As Professor Van Gerven put it in his
comments on Wood Pulp, it is regrettable that "the Court did not take
the opportunity to endorse the general principle of comity . . .
[thereby] drawing attention to the necessity to exercise jurisdiction
reasonably and supporting the practie ... [of] the Commission of
consulting with public authorities of other States."' 95
The Court in Wood Pulp, following the arguments of the United
Kingdom, has made every attempt to confine prescriptive jurisdiction
in EC competition law to a showing of objective territoriality. But the
territoriality principle cannot last long as a stand-alone principle as
national economies become increasingly interdependent and as more
businesses become multinational.196 As Professor Browulie noted,
192. See Soci&f6 Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (Case 56/65), 166 E.C.R.
235, 5 C.M.L.R. 357 (1966), involving the interpretation of the "capable of effecting trade
between member-States" provision of art. 85(l) of the EEC Treaty. The Court of Justice
determined that "the agreement in question should... allow one to expect, with a sufficient
degree of probability, that it would exercise a direct or indirect, actual or potential, effect on
the eddies of trade between member-States." 5 C.M.LR. at 375 (emphasis added).
193. Adelheid Puttler, International Decisions: A. Ahlstrbm v. Commission, 83 Am. J.
Int'l L. 357, 360 (1989). See also Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.R. at 693-96 (Court should adopt direct,
immediate, foreseeable, and substantial test).
194. Lange & Sandage, supra note 162, at 156 n.83.
195. Van Gerven, supra note 11, at 483.
196. Rosenthal & Knighton, supra note 17, at 4.
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"the territorial theory, while remaining the best foundation for the
law, fails to provide ready-made solutions for some modem jurisdic-
tional conflicts." 197 The principle will have to be either supplemented
with other bases of jurisdiction, or so reworked that it loses its origi-
nal identity. The Community appears to be opting for the latter
approach.
As for the United States, the most serious challenge to its approach
is simply that a liberal effects doctrine does not comply with interna-
tional law. As Professor Mann put it bluntly, "from the point of view
of public international law the Alcoa decision cannot . . .be justi-
fied.""' Since the time of Alcoa, however, three factors may have
tempered concerns that the effects doctrine violates international law.
First, the effects doctrine itself has been modified to require direct,
substantial, and foreseeable results. Thus, the FTAIA's reformula-
tion of the effects doctrine greatly reduces the risk of inappropriate
extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction. The requirement that the
effects be direct, substantial and foreseeable ensures that a reasonable
link exists between the domestic territory and the conduct occurring
abroad, and avoids jurisdiction based on incidental or inadvertent
effects on United States commerce. 199 Second, the incorporation of a
comity analysis further ensures that international law is given greater
respect. Coupled with the reformulation of the effects doctrine, con-
cers for international infringements are lessened considerably by the
incorporation of a comity analysis.200 Finally, as discussed above, the
contours of what constitutes the proper bases of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion under international law are themselves changing. Just as the pas-
sive personality theory has been recently used to challenge heretofore
nonexistent threats to international security such as international ter-
rorism, 20 1 the effects doctrine has increasingly been recognized as a
legitimate method to respond to the shrinking nature of international
business relations, the level and variety of transnational activities, and
the anticompetitive activities that arise therefrom.2 "2
197. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 298 (4th ed. 1990).
198. Mann, supra note 50, at 104.
199. Rishikesh, supra note 6, at 36-37.
200. Whether the imposition of discretionary limits upon such jurisdiction, standing alone,
transforms the effects doctrine into an internationally legally permissible approach is open to
debate. It is certainly the case that the criteria utilized to balance foreign sovereignty interests
easily lend themselves to manipulation to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. See supra text
accompanying notes 68-70.
201. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 901-02; 1 Restatement (Third), supra note 3, § 402 cmt. g.
202. See I Restatement (Third), supra note 3, part IV, ch. 1, subch. A, Introductory Note
(international rules of prescriptive jurisdiction are themselves changing, "reflecting
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In short, many view the strict territoriality principle as ill-equipped
to regulate anticompetitive international business activities, and hence
believe international law must change to meet current demands.
There can be little doubt that the territoriality principle, as it is tradi-
tionally understood, cannot filfill the demands of regulating interna-
tional anticompetitive behavior. The question, then, is whether courts
will reformulate, as the Court of Justice did in Wood Pulp, the territo-
riality principle to meet these ever growing demands, or whether
courts generally will take the larger leap of adopting an effects doc-
trine, thereby enhancing its recognition in international law as an
accepted basis for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
This brings up one final point of comparison-their respective
treatment of international comity. The European Court of Justice's
treatment of international comity suggests that it has overlooked the
very purpose and utility of the rules regarding prescriptive jurisdic-
tion. The purpose is not simply to determine which state may exer-
cise jurisdiction, for instances of concurrent jurisdiction are common
enough that the propriety of asserting jurisdiction is, in recent
decades, rarely challenged in the absolute sense.20 3 Rather, challenges
to extraterritorial jurisdiction more commonly are raised in the rela-
tive sense: whether jurisdiction ought to be exercised by state A
rather than state B.21 4 Put this way, the crucial issue is determining
whether one state has the better claim to jurisdiction than the other.
Thus, the two most fundamental questions to be answered are when a
state may exercise jurisdiction and when that state ought to exercise
jurisdiction. The European Court of Justice has thus far addressed
only the first question. One may infer from IBM that the Court of
Justice considers a comity analysis to be subsequent to adverse legal
consequences, rather than preconditional in determining jurisdic-
tion." Most disturbing, the Court appeared to at least partially col-
lapse these two distinct questions when it stated in Wood Pulp that an
objection based upon comity principles "amounts to calling in ques-
tion the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to
conduct such as that found to exist in this case and.., that argument
transformations in global communications, in the level and variety of transnational activity,
and in perceptions of the way states interact with one another.").
203. D. W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority Over Activities and
Resources, 53 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 14 (1982). Note that Continental scholars have challenged,
in the absolute sense, the assertion of jurisdiction by earlier U.S. courts under extreme forms of
the "effects doctrine' exemplified by Alcoa. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
204. Bowett, supra note 203, at 14.
205. IBM, 1981 E.C.R. at 2639.
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has already been rejected."2 °6
The U.S. approach to comity may be challenged not so much for its
failure to give proper recognition to the principles of comity, but for
its application of the doctrine. As noted above, the present formula-
tions of such an approach have been subject to significant criti-
cisms. 20 7 Some have suggested that a judicial balancing approach is
inappropriate because: (1) courts are ill-equipped to balance national
interests against the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations; (2)
it requires protracted discovery and requests for submissions by polit-
ical branches; and (3) it fails to prioritize the factors to be considered
in undergoing the balancing approach such that courts will apply uni-
form weight to a particular factor under all circumstances.20 8 With-
out greater guidance and clear parameters, American-style judicial
balancing may be perceived as illegitimate because it gives courts free
reign to entertain and weigh ill-defined criteria and because it often
operates simply as a means of "assert[ing] ... the primacy of United
States interests in the guise of applying an international jurisdictional
rule of reason."20 9
VI. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
Where there is conflicting or concurrent jurisdiction in competition
enforcement, the best approach is arguably through diplomatic coop-
eration and intergovernmental coordination between competition
enforcement authorities so as to minimize extraterritorial conflicts.21 0
The most concrete manifestation of this approach is the adoption of
competition cooperation agreements coordinating the activities of the
respective enforcement authorities.21'
206. Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71.
208. See id.
209. Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J.
Comp. L. 579, 589-90 (1983).
210. See Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International Disputes Over
Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 Stan. J. Int'l L. 279, 304-07 (1982); Joseph J. Norton,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 575,
596-97 (1979); Davis R. Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1147, 1147-55 (1983).
211. See Bastiaan Van der Esch, Some Aspects of "Extra-Territorial" Infringement of EEC
Competition Rules, 1985 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 285, 295-96 (1986). While this discussion is
limited to a bilateral agreement, there is nothing to suggest that a similar multilateral
agreement for cooperation and coordination of competition enforcement could not be adopted.
See EEC/US: Competition Pact Aims for New Level of Cooperation, European Report
(External Relations), No. 1706, Sept. 25, 1991, at 2 (on file with author) (U.S.-EC agreement
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The need for intergovernmental competition cooperation agree-
ments stems from four interrelated problems: (1) the potential for
concurrent and conflicting jurisdiction caused by the increasing inter-
dependence of national markets, the creation of world markets, and
the "internationalization" of mergers and acquisitions;212 (2) the exer-
cise of overbroad extraterritorial jurisdiction by enforcement authori-
ties, especially in the United States, which often unnecessarily
undercuts the sovereignty interests of foreign authorities;2 3 (3) the
reluctance of governmental enforcement authorities to defer to sister
enforcement authorities the opportunity to make enforcement deci-
sions where the former's interests, though substantial, are secon-
dary;214 and (4) the rendering of internationally unaccommodating
decisions by enforcement agencies, who by paying merely lip service
to comity, have exercised their enforcement discretion. 1 5
In response, "representatives of competition authorities around the
world have called [in recent years] for more international cooperation
in antitrust enforcement." 216  Significantly, such an agreement has
recently been adopted in the bilateral US-EC Competition Laws Co-
operation Agreement (the "Co-operation Agreement") signed on Sep-
tember 23, 1991.217 This "historic" Co-operation Agreement was
described by Sir Leon Brittan, EC Commissioner for Competition, as
"an important first step in placing our relations with the U.S. authori-
ties in the antitrust field on a formal footing" which will "help each
could encourage discussions over a possible future multilateral antitrust agreement); Griffin,
supra note 210, at 305-06 (arguing that "the best long-term solutions are multilateral
agreements" on antitrust enforcement); Norton, supra note 210, at 596 (discussing "revival of
multilateral endeavors to codify... international principles respecting antitrust matters.").
But see U.S. Lawyers Predict Negative Impact on Business Sector From New U.S.-EC
Accord, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1446 (Oct. 2, 1991) (Commission officials
rejecting the notion that the U.S.-EC agreement would serve as a basis for a multilateral
agreement) [hereinafter Lawyers Predict Negative Impact].
212. Charles S. Stark, International Mergers and Joint Ventures: A View From the Justice
Department, 1990 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 21, 21 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991).
213. Douglas E. Rosenthal, The Potential for Jurisdictional Conflicts in Multistate
International Merger Transactions, 1990 Fordham Corp. L Inst. 87, 89 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
1991).
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Deborah K. Owen & John J. Parisi, International Mergers and Joint Ventures: A
Federal Trade Commission Perspective, 1990 Fordham Corp. L Inst. 1, 13 (Barry E. Hawk
ed., 1991). See also Rosenthal, supra note 213, at 93 (noting that a German official has
proposed the creation of a multilateral international competition agency).
217. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991) [hereinafter Co-operation
Agreement].
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side to take the other's interests into account in a timely way in cases
with an international dimension. 21 8 The U.S. counterpart, Attorney
General William P. Barr, noted that "increasing integration of our
economies and the emergence of an international business environ-
ment make cooperation between our governments in the area of anti-
trust enforcement absolutely essential. Th[is] agreement ... grows
out of a shared commitment to antitrust enforcement as a cornerstone
of our market economies. ' 21 9
The genesis for this Co-operation Agreement was a speech by Sir
Leon Brittan on February 8, 1990 at Cambridge University. 220 As he
put it:
I personally favour.., a treaty between the European Com-
munity and the United States. It would provide for consul-
tations, exchanges of non-confidential information, mutual
assistance, and best endeavours to cooperate in enforcement
where policies coincide and to resolve dispute where they do
not.... [Wlherever possible, only one party should exercise
jurisdiction over the same set of facts. To make that possi-
ble, a party with jurisdiction should be ready not to exercise
it in certain defined circumstances, while the other party, in
its exercise of jurisdiction, should agree to take full account
of the interests and views of its partner.221
Thus, Commissioner Brittan envisaged an agreement which would
actually involve antitrust enforcement authorities undertaking to
decide "which side of the Atlantic would have the responsibility for
competition-related review of a particular transaction ... [implicat-
ing] both American and European interests. ' 222 In the wake of this
speech and a similar one in New York in March 1990,223 a flurry of
218. EEC/US: Range and Content of the Agreement on the Application of the Antitrust
Cooperation-Statement by Sir Leon Brittan, Europe, No. 5574 (new series), Sept. 25, 1991, at
9 (on file with author) [hereinafter Range and Content of the Agreement]. See U.S.,
Commission Sign Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1407
(Sept. 25, 1991) (hereinafter Antitrust Cooperation Accord].
219. Range and Content of the Agreement, supra note 218, at 9.
220. Sir Leon Brittan, Jurisdictional Issues in EEC Competition Law, Hersch Lauterpacht
Memorial Lecture, Cambridge University (Feb. 8, 1990), in Sir Leon Brittan, Competition
Policy and Merger Control in the Single European Market 1-21 (1991) [hereinafter Brittan
Lecture].
221. Id. at 20-21.
222. Edward F. Glynn, International Agreements to Allocate Jurisdiction Over Mergers,
1990 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 35, 44 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1991).
223. See Sir Leon Brittan, Competition Policy in the European Community: The New
Merger Regulation, Address before the EC Chamber of Commerce, in New York (Mar. 26,
1990) (on file with author).
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bilateral negotiations culminated in the Co-operation Agreement
signed on September 23, 1991, a feat of diplomatic cooperation
accomplished at a speed that surprised both Commissioner Brittan
and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Janet Steiger.224
In fact, the Co-operation Agreement not only far exceeds the scope
of existing cooperation agreements,' m it goes well beyond the aspira-
tions set forth in the Brittan Lecture. The Co-operation Agreement,
in addition to providing for the exchange of information and consulta-
tion 26 analogous to provisions in existing cooperation agreements,
also establishes a framework within which the parties agree to coordi-
nate their enforcement activities regarding the anticompetitive activi-
ties that affect the interests of both parties. In considering whether to
coordinate their activities, the parties shall consider, inter alia,
whether such coordination will result in increased efficiency, will
enable the collection of the necessary information for enforcement
proceedings, will facilitate the realization of enforcement objectives,
and will reduce the costs incurred by persons subject to the enforce-
ment activities.227
Moreover, in one of the most innovative provisions, article V pro-
vides for "positive comity"'22 allowing one party to notify the other
party and request that party to initiate enforcement action where the
notifying party believes anticompetitive activities adverse to its impor-
tant interests are occurring in the territory of the other party. The
notified party, while not required to initiate enforcement proceedings,
must advise the notifying party of its decision whether or not to initi-
ate enforcement activities and of the outcome of any such proceed-
ings.229 This provision led one Commission official to describe the
Co-operation Agreement as different from earlier bilateral coopera-
224. See Antitrust Cooperation Accord, supra note 218.
225. The United States has bilateral antitrust consultation agreements with Australia,
Canada and Germany. See Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation
and Application of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 23 I.LM.
275 (1984); Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-
Austf., 34 U.S.T. 388; Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956. The United States and the
European Community are also parties to the OECD Council Recommendation Concerning
Co-operation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade, OECD Doc. C(86)44(Final) (June 5, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.LM. 1629
(1986). See generally Glynn, supra note 222, at 37-42.
226. See Co-operation Agreement, supra note 217, art. III.
227. Id. art. IV.
228. See awyers Predict Negative Impact, supra note 211, at 1445 (Commission officials
stating that the Agreement "breaks new ground in introducing concept of 'positive comity' ").
229. See Co-operation Agreement, supra note 217, art. V.
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tion agreements because it is "more positive in approach" with its
emphasis on cooperation and comity.230
Finally, and most importantly, the Co-operation Agreement adopts
a comity analysis to be used where one party's enforcement activities
may adversely affect important interests of the other party. Article VI
provides that "each Party will seek, at all stages in its enforcement
activities, to take into account the important interests of the other
Party. Each Party shall consider important interests of the other
Party in decisions as to whether or not to initiate an investigation or
proceeding. ' 231 The Co-operation Agreement sets forth several fac-
tors to be considered in the comity analysis including, inter alia: (i)
"the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities involved of
conduct within the enforcing Party's territory as compared to conduct
within the other Party's territory;" (ii) the intent of the participants in
the anticompetitive activities "to affect consumers, suppliers, or com-
petitors within the enforcing Party's territory;" (iii) "the effects of the
anticompetitive activities on the enforcing Party's interests as com-
pared to the effects on the other Party's interests;" (iv) whether rea-
sonable expectations "would be furthered or defeated by the
enforcement activities;" (v) "the degree of conflict or consistency
between the enforcement activities and the other Party's laws or
articulated economic policies;" and (vi) "the extent to which enforce-
ment activities of the other Party ... [are] affected. ' 232 These factors
thus incorporate, in an international cooperation agreement, a comity
analysis similar to criteria set forth in established case law on the sub-
ject.233 The Co-operation Agreement is effective immediately and is
subject to review in two years with a view to identifying additional
areas in which the parties could cooperate.234
Thus, there is now in existence a "jurisdictional rule of reason"
approach for all enforcement proceedings initiated by the United
States or the European Community affecting the significant economic
interests of the other party. Most important, the agreement signals a
willingness by two of the world's most powerful trading partners to
cooperate closely together to minimize jurisdictional conflicts and
maximize effective enforcement against international anticompetitive
activities.235 As such, the Co-operation Agreement represents a
230. See Lawyers Predict Negative Impact, supra note 211, at 1446.
231. Co-operation Agreement, supra note 217, art. VI.
232. See id. art. VI.
233. See Glynn, supra note 222, at 46; supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
234. See Co-operation Agreement, supra note 217, art. XI.
235. The impact of the Co-operation Agreement should be both immediate and substantial.
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"solid antitrust front ' '1 3 6 against anticompetitive conduct adversely
implicating U.S. or European interests.
Multilateral or bilateral agreements of the kind signed by the
United States and the European Community provide a reasonable and
balanced solution for minimizing conflicts that arise from the extra-
territorial application of antitrust laws. Indeed, one commentator
was particularly prescient in 1985 in remarking that "[i]n an ideal
world, the principle of mutual respect would require nations to enter
into express treaties before asserting jurisdiction over the activities of
each other's citizens."' 237 The Co-operation Agreement represents a
positive step on the road toward this "ideal world" of mutual respect.
It undoubtedly signals closer ties of cooperative antitrust enforcement
between the United States and the European Community, and thereby
enhances the mutual respect for each party's interest in regulating for-
eign anticompetitive activity without unduly imposing on the other's
legitimate sovereignty interests. As such, the Co-operation Agree-
ment marks, in the words of Assistant Attorney General James F.
Rill, "an important step toward minimizing disputes over extraterri-
torial application of the antitrust law."'-38
This is not to say, however, that intergovernmental cooperation
agreements are a panacea for avoiding all extraterritorial conflicts.
Specifically, such agreements cannot resolve the problems arising
from private suits in U.S. courts because the U.S. government cannot
legally control private treble-damage actions.-' 9 Thus, while competi-
tion cooperation agreements are useful for alleviating conflicts arising
from government enforcement of antitrust laws, courts will continue
to play a vital role in minimizing international conflicts arising from
private suits seeking to apply antitrust laws extraterritorially.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the debate on the so-called extraterritorial application of
laws is in reality about the fate of extraterritorially induced infringe-
ments of competition laws. Subject to due respect for foreign sover-
Over 10% of all mergers reported to the U.S. government in 1991 dealt with firms located in
the European Community. See Antitrust Cooperation Accord, supra note 218, at 1407 (FTC
Chairman, Janet Steiger, reporting that of 1,500 mergers reported, 340 transactions involved
foreign nations, of which 160 dealt with firms located in the EC).
236. EC, U.S. to Work Together on Antitrust Enforcement, Wall St. J. (Europe), Sept. 24,
1991, at 3.
237. Predictability and Comity, supra note 98, at 1322.
238. Range and Content of the Agreement, supra note 218, at 10.
239. Rishikesh, supra note 6, at 59-60.
1992]
50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
eignty interests, the fate of such extraterritorial infringements should
not be materially different from the fate of wholly internal infringe-
ments.24 It is for this reason that the "implementation" approach
will not be the final word from the European Community on the
extraterritorial application of its competition laws. Just as the "eco-
nomic entity" approach in Dyestuffs gave way in the face of foreign
infringements beyond its logical reach, the "implementation
approach" of Wood Pulp will necessarily give way to a broader extra-
territorial scope as soon as an export boycott or similar infringement
beyond the logical reach of the implementation approach is consid-
ered by the European Court of Justice. Moreover, the "direct, sub-
stantial and foreseeable" effects doctrine of the U.S. will continue to
grow in usage and acceptance such that international law will (if it
has not already)241 recognize it as a permissible basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction. Finally, comity analysis will continue to play an increas-
ing role in the jurisdictional inquiry as an aid to determining whether
foreign sovereignty interests have been given adequate solicitude.
Where there is conflicting or concurrent jurisdiction in competition
enforcement, the best solution, at least for government-initiated
enforcement proceedings, arguably lies in international cooperation
agreements seeking to coordinate activities and avoid enforcement
conflicts. Thus, in cases involving U.S. interests in the European
Community or European activities in the United States, there now
exists a legal basis for applying principles of comity to determine the
appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction in competition cases. While
such an agreement provides little solace to other trading partners, it
does indicate a positive step in the direction of respect for interna-
tional comity and, more importantly, conflict avoidance in instances
of extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
240. Van der Esch, supra note 211, at 298.
241. See Meessen, supra note 99, at 798-801 (arguing that effects doctrine comports with
customary international law provided that the state asserting jurisdiction has "reasonably close
contact" with the foreign activities to be regulated); Barry E. Hawk, United States, Common
Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide 16 (Supp. 1983) ("[G]enerally...
public international law today does not preclude reliance on an effects doctrine .... "). Cf. M.
Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Conflict and
Compromise, 31 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 127, 136 (1982) ("IT[he effects doctrine ofjurisdiction...
does not accord with international law rules relating to jurisdiction.").
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